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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Taxation-Review of Discretionary Decisions.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue reassessed a corporate taxpayer after having determined an overpayment and paid a refund.'
Such determination was not reviewable by the courts.2 The taxpayer
contended that the Commissioner was precluded from redetermining.
tax liability here because the refund had already been paid and the
discretionary power had been exhausted.3 The court, relying on Mclhenny v. Commissioner,4 held such redetermination proper, implying
that ordinarily, in the absence of a closing agreement or the running
of the statute of limitations, the tax administrators may reopen and
redetermine as often as they choose. 5
At first blush it seems highly irregular that an official, whose discretionary decision is conclusive against the taxpayer, may redetermine;
but it appears sounder upon the realization that here was a refund
'This overpayment and consequent refund came as a result of a special
assessment after the general assessment had been made and the tax paid. Under
the Revenue Acts of 1917 and 1918 the commissioner was empowered to grant
a special assessment of income and profits tax after the regular assessment upon
petition by a taxpayer who could show great hardship as a result of the regular
tax. The standard was the amount of tax paid by other similar concerns under
the regular provisions of the taxing acts. These relief provisions were designed

to administer the hastily raised tax more equitably in unusual cases. 40 STAT.

300 (1917); 40

STAT.

1057, 1088, 1093 (1918).

In a recent Congressional enact-

ment, basis for the arising of a similar situation was laid in the Second Revenue
Act of 1940 whereby the commissioner was empowered to make discretionary

special assessments to avoid hardships. Pub. L. No. 801, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess.
(Oct. 8, 1940) §§721, 722.
1 Williamsport Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 551, 48 Sup. Ct. 587, 72 L. ed.
985 (1927); cf. Blair v. Osterlein Machine Co., 275 U. S. 220, 48 Sup. Ct. 87,
72 L. ed. 249 (1927). Ordinarily general and special tax assessments may be
reviewed in a court of law. In effect this interpretation prevented a taxpayer
from attacking the commissioner's decision under this particular special determination 1power.
'Butte, Anaconda & Pacific Ry. v. United States, 290 U. S. 127, 54 Sup. Ct.
108, 78 L. ed. 222 (1933), (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 503.
'39 F. (2d) 356 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1930). The commissioner was allowed to
reopen an income tax case, in which he had allowed a deduction and in which
the tax had been paid, in the absence of evidence of fraud or other new evidence.
A closing agreement being available, and no binding agreement having been entered into, the commissioner still had power to reconsider. 42 STAT. 227 (1921).
This case leads in giving general effect to the closing agreement provisions of
the Revenue Act of 1921 in connection with all federal tax cases settled after
its passage even though the tax itself was based on a prior tax law. Burnet v.
Porter, 283 U. S. 230, 51 Sup. Ct. 416, 75 L. ed. 996 (1931) (Supreme Court
expressed approval of McIlhenny v. Commissioner, supra).
'New Jersey Worsted Mills v. Gnichtel, 31 F. Supp. 908 (D. N. J. 1940)
(By following McIlhenny v. Commissioner; 39 F. (2d) 356 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1930),
cited supra note 4, the court not only admits the general application of the
closing agreement provisions of the Revenue Act of 1921, but also sanctions its
application in this exceptional case where no court review is available to the
taxpayer.).
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based on an exception to the general tax, i.e., a gratuity.0 The taxpayer's hardship arises not so much from the commissioner's power to
reopen as from his own inability to obtain a court review of the
determination; 7 however, here the taxpayer petitioned for a special
assessment and may thus be said to have assented to this hardship 8
Reassessments being allowed generally, should this unusual situation
constitute an exception to that rule?
Congress, by providing for a definite method for obtaining finality,
viz. a closing agreement, may properly be said to have negatived other
modes.9 Proof that Congress intended no exceptions is found in the
fact that substantially these same provisions have been thrice enacted.10
Thus the question resolves into one of desirability.
The Commissioner may reassess for fraud or mistake of fact or
law,'1 and under present statute he may reconsider ordinary tax assessments within the statute of limitations period.12 Previously refunds
could be recovered any time within that period in the absence of closing
agreements, but statute has narrowed this to two years after payment.18
14
There is express authorization of successive deficiency assessments,
' See note 1, supra (This was a refund based on an exception to the general
tax law). See Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571, 577, 54 Sup. Ct. 840, 842,
78 L. ed. 1434, 1439 (1934) (taxpayer receives no vested interest in refunds);
Frisbie v. United States, 157 U. S. 160, 166, 15 Sup. Ct. 586, 588, 39 L. ed. 657,
659 (1895).
" This hardship, -pointed out to be unusual in note 2, supra, the taxpayer suffered in the original special assessment. The question, then, is whether or not
commissioners should be allowed to reconsider their discretionary decisions. Assuming this to be answered "yes", one still sees no change, resulting from the
reconsideration, in the rights of the taxpayer to seek a review of the commissioner's decision. If he had it in the first place, he has it after the reconsideration; if he didn't have it at first, he has been deprived of nothing by lacking it
after the reconsideration.
8 See United States v. Henry Prentiss & Co., 288 U. S. 73, 87, 53 Sup. Ct. 283,
286, 77 L. ed. 626, 632 (1933) ; Michigan Iron & Land Co. v. United States, 10
F. Supp. 563 (Ct. Cl., 1935); Central Iron & Steel Co. v. United States, 6 F.
Supp. 115 (Ct. Cl., 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 563, 55 Sup. Ct. 75, 79 L. ed.
663 (1934).
' Botony Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U. S. 282, 49 Sup. Ct. 129,
73 L. ed. 379 (1928). But see Loewy & Son v. Commissioner, 31 F. (2d) 652,
654 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929).
1042 STAT. 313 (1921); 43 STAr. 340 (1924); 44 STAT. 113 (1926). Oak
Worsted Mills v. United States, 38 F. (2d) 699, 702 (Ct. Cl., 1930). For comprehensive history of these statutes see 26 U. S. C. §3772.
" Woodworth v. Kales, 26 F. (2d) 178 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928); Boyne City
Lumber Co. v. Doyle, 47 F. (2d) 772 (W. D. Mich. 1930); see Penrose v.
Skinner, 298 Fed. 335, 337 (D. Colo. 1923).
1252 STAT. 573 (1938), 26 U. S. C. §3760(a) (Supp. 1939). United States v.
Green, 28 F. Supp. 549 (E. D. Pa. 1939).
13 United States v. Wurts, 303 U. S. 414, 58 Sup. Ct. 637, 82 L. ed. 932
(1937). When the two-year period in which suit may be allowed after rejection
of a claim for a refund has expired, the commissioner has no authority to
reopen the rejected claim for the refund. First National Bank v. United States,
102 F. (2d) 907 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939), cert. denied, 307 U. S. 641, 59 Sup. Ct.
103 (1939).
1038. 83 STAT.
L. ed.740,
26 U. S. C. §271 (1934). An erroneous refund is recoverable
1448
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bordering upon a denial of res judicata principles; however, in the
absence of a definite statutory determination of the matter, unanimity
has not existed among all the courts, for there was some earlier insistence upon finality.' 5 Foremost among cases so insisting was Woodworth v. Kales 6 which prevented the commissioner from revaluating
stock already assessed for income tax determination, which assessment
was approved and re-approved by himself and his predecessors in
office. Although possessing elements of estoppel, this case stood on the
principle that no redetermination may be made of a discretionary decision in the absence of fraud or gross error. This position has been
distinguished and discredited until it is now of little more than historic
8
value.17 Dissents have infrequently taken a stand for conclusiveness,
but since 1930, courts have consistently allowed the Commissioner to
redetermine at any time within the statute of limitations, thereby achieving uniformity.' 9 Final sanction would occur if the Supreme Court
by a subsequent deficiency assessment. Burnet v. Porter, 283 U. S. 230, 51 Sup.
Ct. 416, 75 L. ed. 996 (1931).
" Bonwit Teller & Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 258, 51 Sup. Ct. 395, 75 L.
ed. 1018 (1931) (used up his jurisdiction by signing certificate of overassessment
and receiving waiver from taxpayer) ; United States v. Detroit Steel Products
Co., 20 F. (2d) 675 (E. D. Mich. 1927) (in authorizing refund, commissioner
acted quasi-judicially, and in the absence of fraud or gross error his decision is
binding on the government) ; Buick Motor Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 43 F. (2d)
385 (E. D. Wis. 1930), aff'd, 48 F. (2d) 801 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931), cert. denied,
284 U. S. 655, 52 Sup. Ct. 33, 76 L, ed. 555 (1931) (authorized judgment of tax
official on competent evidence not generally subject to reconsideration . . . must
be error or new facts) ; Boyne City Lumber Co. v. Doyle, 47 F. (2d) 772 (W. D.
Mich. 1930) (slight error in base evaluation of property for income tax computation after sale was insufficient to allow reconsideration) ; see Kaufman v. United
States, 11 Ct. Cl. 659, 670, aff'd, 96 U. S. 567, 24 L. ed. 792 (1878) ; Penrose v.
Skinner, 298 Fed. 335, 337 (D. Colo. 1923); Daube v. United States, 289 U. S.
367, 372, 53 Sup. Ct. 597, 599, 77 L. ed. 1261, 1264 (1933).
" 26 F. (2d) 178 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928), (1929) 27 MIcH. L. Rxv. 677 (flagrant
abuse of power motivated by political animosity is the possible explanation for
this17case). But cf. James Couzens, 11 B. T. A. 1040 (1928).
Holmquist v. Blair, 35 F. (2d) 10 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929); Austin v. Commissioner, 35 F. (2d) 910 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929) (presumption that commissioner
is acting under the right to change, i.e. fraud or error); Oak Worsted Mills v.
United States, 38 F. (2d) 699 (Ct. Cl., 1930) ; Mcllhenny v. Commissioner,
39 F. (2d) 356 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1930); Page v. Lafayette Worsted Co., 66 F.
(2d) 339 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 692, 54 Sup. Ct. 127, 78
L. ed. 596 (1933) (distinguished).
18 See Austin v. Commissioner, 35 F.
(2d) 910, 913 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929);
Page v. Lafayette Worsted Co., 66 F. (2d) 339, 342 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933), cert.
denied, 290 U. S. 692, 54 Sup. Ct. 127, 78 L. ed. 596 (1933). For comparison see
excerpt from the commissioner's general order of January 20, 1923 in McIlhenny
v. Commissioner, 39 F. (2d) at 358 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1930).
1 Burnet v. Porter, 283 U. S. 230, 51
Sup. Ct. 416, 75 L. ed. 996 (1931),
aff'g. MeIlhenny v. Commissioner, 39 F. (2d) 356 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1930) ; Stanford University Book Store v. Helvering, 83 F. (2d) 710 (App. D. C. 1936).
The changed determination may involve a revaluation on the same facts. Levy
v. Commissioner, 48 F. (2d) 725 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931). However, the courts
have refrained from an out and out declaration allowing the commissioner, in
the absence of specific statutory allowance, to reverse his discretionary decision as
to the granting of statutory special assessments when faced with the same facts.
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adopted the holding in The Sweets Co. of America v. Commissioner,0
that ". . whether he believed his predecessor's ruling erroneous in law
or fact is immaterial . . . Within the statutory period of limitations and
in the absence of a binding settlement, the commissioner had authority
to re-examine and redetermine the petitioner's tax liability."
In current federal taxation statutes the legislative intent is clear
insofar as the statutes providing for closing agreements and deficiency
assessments are the only restrictions on the commissioner's power of
review.2 1 In the interest of arriving at a proper and uniform tax this
vested discretion appears justified.
State tax administration has pursued an opposite course yielding
to the argument that taxpayers experienced annoyance and uncertainty
from numerous reassessments, especially when merely representative of
a changed view of the same facts.2 2 Statutes often provide for back
assessments of omitted property,23 but a reassessment because of official
omission or undervaluation of property included in the taxpayer's returns has usually been denied since such property has already been
subjected to tax, however inadequate.2 4 Even a statutory provision for
reassessment upon incorrect levies has been interpreted to give that
power only when new facts come to light.2 5 Actual collusion with govAustin v. Commissioner, 35 F. (2d) 910, (C. C. A. 6th, 1929) ; Page v. Lafayette
Worsted Co., 66 F. (2d) 339, cert. denied, 290 U. S. 692, 54 Sup. Ct. 127, 78
L. ed. 596 (1933). Omaha Baum Iron Store v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 703
Ct. Cl., 1934); United States v. Green, 28 F. Supp. 549 (E. D. Pa. 1939) (though
the law relied on at the time of the determination was the only law in existence,
a subsequent change of the law by the Supreme Court allows the commissioner
to recover the refund previously granted, if he acts within the statute of limitations period). Contra: Tumulty v. District of Columbia, 102 F. (2d) 254 (App,
(personal property tax).
D. 2040
C. 1939)
F. (2d) 436, at 438 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
2152 STAT. 573 (1938), 26 U. S. C. §3760(a) (Supp. 1939) (,provides for a
binding closing agreement as to future tax liability). 48 STAT. 740, 26 U. S. C.
§271 (1934) (provides for successive deficiency assessments). 52 STAT. .578, 26
U. S. C. §3761 (1938) (provides for compromise agreements, the statutory method
being the only final one).
Tax Commission, 163 Okla. 185, 20 P. (2d) 904
2 Champlin v. Oklahoma
(1933). An additional consideration is the apparent injustice of permitting the
government to reopen questions of tax liability while the taxpayer is concluded by
his payment on the original assessment. Coulter v. Louisville Bridge Co., 114
Ky. 42, 70 S. W. 29 (1902).
CoDE (1939) §7105.1; Miss. CoDE ANN. (1930) §3197; N. C. CoDE
22IowA
(Michie,
1939) §7971(163) (5).
2
,Hunt v. District of Columbia, 108 F. (2d) 10 (App. D. C. 1939); Langhout
v. First National Bank, 191 Iowa 957, 183 N. W. 506 (1921); Commonwealth
v. Robinson, Norton & Co., 146 Ky. 218, 142 S. W. 406 (1912); Wolfenden v.
Commissioners, 152 N. C. 83, 67 S. E. 319 (1910); Chowan County v. Commissioner of Banks, 202 N. C. 672, 163 S. E. 808 (1932); County of Buncombe v.
Beverly Hills, Inc., 203 N. C. 170, 165 S. E. 335 (1932); Town of Rockingham v.
Hood ex rel. Bank of Pee Dee, 204 N. C. 618, 169 S. E. 191 (1933).
Adams v. Clarke, 80 Miss. 134, 31 So. 216 (1902).

But cf.

2 State ex rel. Schuster Realty Co. v. Lyons, 184 Wis. 175, 197 N. W. 585
(1924).
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ernment agents is necessary to warrant reopening assessments for
fraud, 26 and courts seem even less inclined to allow reassessments
where the error is of law.27 Despite the concession that as a practical
matter taxing officials rely on taxpayers' returns in the exigency of
voluminous work, and that a flexible system is 'desirable,28 assessments
are still extensively held conclusive 29 There might be good reason for
the presence of greater finality in property and franchise taxes, assessed
by the officials,80 but state income taxes are so like the federal, the
taxpayers assessing themselves, that there seems no good reason for
this difference. In many cases it appears as the application by courts
of the broad principles enunciated in property cases to this newer tax. 1
Gradually by legislation and judicial interpretation states are intro82
ducing into taxation administrative leeway
11 Compare State ex ret. Tax Commission v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 171
Okla. 498, 41 P. (2d) 876 (1935) with Adams v. Clarke, 80 Miss. 134, 31 So. 216
(1902). Deliberate failures to list property items or to report accurate valuations
have not been deemed sufficiently reprehensible to overcome the presumption that
the tax assessor had performed his duty. Commonwealth v. Robinson, Norton
& Co., 146 Ky. 218, 142 S. W. 406 (1912); Sudderth v Brittain, 76 N. C. 458
(1876).
"vAnniston City Land Co. v. State, 185 Ala. 482, 64 So. 110 (1913). But
cf. Buick Motor Co. v. Milwaukee, 43 F. (2d) 385 (E. D. Wis. 1930), aff'd, 48 F.
(2d) 801 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 655, 52 Sup. Ct. 33, 76
L. ed. 555 (1931), in which the court introduces some of the federal tax system's
flexibility into the state system.
" See dissent in Miller v. Copeland's Estate, 139 Miss. 788, 812, 104 So. 176,
177 (1925), which argues that permitting unlisted property to go untaxed is both
unfair to the other taxpayers and conducive to fraud.
",Coulter v. Louisville Bridge Co., 114 Ky. 42, 70 S. W. 29 (1902) (franchise
tax); Commonwealth v. Kentucky Heating Co., 176 Ky. 35, 195 S. W. 459,
modified, 180 Ky. 607, 203 S. W. 538 (1918) (corporation tax); State ex rel.
Ford Motor Co. v. Gehner, 325 Mo. 24, 27 S. W. (2d) 1 (1930) (income tax) ;
State ex rel. Tax Commission v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 171 Okla. 498, 41 P.
(2d) 876 (1935) (property tax).
" Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Board of Education, 80 F. (2d) 307
(C. 1C. A. 5th, 1935).
" State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Gehner, 325 Mo. 24, 27 S. W. (2d) 1
(1930); State ex rel. Schuster Realty Co. v. Lyons, 184 Wis. 175, 197 N. ,W.
585, aff'd, 184 Wis. 492, 199 N. W. 48 (1924); Arizona Tax Commission v.
Tucson Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., 103 P. (2d) 467, nwdified, 103 P. (2d)
955 (Ariz. 1940).
82 N. C. Con
(Michie, 1939) §7971(163) (6) (property tax provision allowing for reassessment where facts newly come to the attention of the assessor
which would permit a board of equalization, if they were confronted -with this
same newevidence, to raise the assessment). Head v. McKenney, 61 Ga. App.
552, 6 S. E. (2d) 405 (1939) (where state income tax law provided that the
tax should be one-third of that paid to the federal government, an additional
assessment by the federal government against the taxpayer permitted an additional assessment by the state). Cf. N. C. CODE (Michie, 1939) §7880(152) (taxpayer must report any change in his federal income tax to the state officials;
for failure to report *he cannot claim the running of the statute of limitations).
The implication of this statute points toward the allowance of reassessments by
state officials, but could they change their decision, as in the instant case, where
there has been a general assessment, a discretionary special assessment whereupon
the state makes its first change, and then a change of the special assessment by
the federal officials? Clearly state officials should have the power to reconsider
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Close analogies are found in other fields, including determinations

by the interstate commerce commission,"3 land patent board,8 4 workmen's compensation commission,35 and immigration department"" which
are characterized as quasi-judicial and thus afford ground for holding
that the body making the decision has no power to change it.37 It is
reasoned that since all administrative power arises from statute, these
decisions may be held final as against the official in the absence of
statutory provisions to the contrary88 as over against the rationale that
such absence of statute leaves the field wide open for reconsiderations.80
Another theory is that the officer's authority is exhausted by its initial
exercise, 40 this conflicting with the idea that such freedom of redetermination achieves greater justice.41 Actually whether finality is to
be accorded to administrative determinations or whether they may be
reopened by their determiners appears governed by particular circumstances and not by any comprehensive judicial rule. 42 Where legislative
policy remains unexpressed, it appears desirable to decide the power of
administrative agencies to reverse their former actions according to the
nature of the proceedings involved and the nature of the substantive
law administered. A policy of judicial laissez faire seems preferable,
since administrative agencies are best qualified to develop their own
in cases where the provisions of the state law involved depend upon the disposition- of the same matter by the federal officials, but may the state officials
change their decisions where the state law provisions are independent and the
state official's decision is also independent of outside considerations?
" Butte, Anaconda & Pac. Ry. v. United States, 290 U. S. 127, 54 Sup. Ct.
108, 78 L. ed. 222 (1933) ; Note (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1250.
"Noble v. Union River Logging R. R., 147 U. S. 165, 13 Sup. Ct. 271,
37 L. ed. 123 (1893); Ballinger v. United States ex rel. Frost, 216 U. S. 240,
30 Sup. Ct 338, 54 L. ed. 464 (1910) ; Lane v. Watts, 234 U. S. 525, 34 Sup. Ct.
965, 58 L. ed. 1440 (1914) ; Kern River Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 147, 42
Sup. Ct. 60, 66 L. ed. 175 (1921) ; Great Northern Ry. v. Steinke, 261 U. S. 119,
43 Sup. Ct. 316, 67 L. ed. 564 (1923); West v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S.
200, 49 Sup. Ct. 138, 73 L. ed. 265 (1929).
"Notes (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1250, (1929) 27 MicH. L. REv. 677; (1927)
4 Wis. L. REv. 175.

"' Sharp, Conclusive Administrative Decisions (1930) 5 IND. L. J. 563.
"Lilienthal v. Wyandotte, 286 Mich. 604, 282 N. W. 837 (1938); Shugg v.
Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 100 Mont. 159. 46 P. (2d) 435 (1935).
"Connor's Case, 126 Me. 37, 115 Atl. 520 (1921); Hyland v. Waldo, 158
App. Div. 654, 143 N. Y. Supp. 901 (1st Dep't 1913).
Pearson v. Williams, 202 U. S. 281, 26 Sup. Ct. 608, 50 L. ed. 1029 (1906);
Gage v. Gunthar, 136 Cal. 338, 68 Pac. 710 (1902).
. State ex rel. Gillespie v. Thursby, 104 Fla. 103, 139 So. 372, rehearing denied, 104 Fla. 103, 140 So. 775 (1932); Kern River Co. v. United States, 257
U. S. 147, 42 Sup. Ct. 60, 66 L. ed. 175 (1921); see dissent in Austin v. Commissioner, 35 F. (2d) 910, 913 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929).

' Holmquist v. Blair, 35 F. (2d) 10 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929) ; United States v.
Green, 28 F. Supp. 549 (E. D. Pa. 1939); Omaha Baum Iron Store v. United
States, 8 F. Supp. 703 (Ct. Cl. 1934).
" Compare In re Smiling, 193 N. C. 448, 137 S. E. 319 (1927), with Board
v. Little, 195 N. C. 793, 143 S. E. 827 (1928).

1940]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

res judicata practices out of intimate acquaintance with their individual
43
problems.
GILBERT C. HINE.

Civil Procedure-Use of Motion to Strike.
If appealed cases afford an accurate criterion, the statutory motion
to strike from pleadings is becoming much more prevalent in the North
Carolina courts. In the last completed volume of the North Carolina
Reports, there are five cases raising the point as compared to only
twenty-five in the previous sixteen volumes. The part of the statute
with which this note is concerned provides in effect that irrelevant or
redundant matter may be stricken out on the motion of the aggrieved
party, if made before answer or demurrer, or before extension of time
is granted in which to plead.'
In a recent suit against a railroad and its employee for negligent
injuries from the use of firearms in the hands of the employee, the trial
court, on defendant's motion, struck from the amended complaint allegations that the individual defendant was possessed of a nervous and
irritable disposition, and of a violent and ungovernable temper. On
appeal the Supreme Court reversed the trial court only as to the nervous disposition, saying "Irritability and violent and ungovernable temper could hardly be a contributing factor to negligence, while nervousness may readily be a concomitant part thereof, and the retaining of a
person equipped with firearms with which to guard the railway station
of which he was in charge, when such person was known to possess a
nervous disposition, might constitute negligence on the part of the railway company." 2 In passing it may be said that such a distinction is
rather difficult to comprehend. The reverse appears nearer the truth.
The principal case lays down a general rule that seems quite popular
with the court: "On a motion to strike out, the test of relevancy of a
pleading is the right of the pleader to present the facts to which the
allegation relates in the evidence upon the trial."3 The difficulty of this
rule is in its application. There is no apparent reconcilable or pre" Note, Res Judicatain Administrative Law (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1250. Also

see Culp, Administrative Remedies In the Assessment and Enforcement of State
Taxes (1938) 17 N. C. L. REv. 118, in which a hands-off policy is suggested to
the courts insofar as upsetting expert administrative determinations as to tax
liability, thereby relying more heavily on the bodies' expertness.
IN.

C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §537.

'Whitlow v. Southern Ry., 217 N. C. 558, 8 S. E. (2d) 809 (1940).
' Pemberton v. Greensboro, 203 N. C. 514, 166 S. E. 396 (1932) ; Patterson v.
Southern Ry., 214 N. C. 38, 198 S. E. 364 (1938) ; Virginia Trust Co. v. Dunlop,
214 N. C. 196, 198 S. E. 645 (1938) ; Duke v. Crippled Childrens' Hospital, 214
N. C. 570, 199 S. E. 918 (1938); Wadesboro v. Coxe, 215 N. C. 708, 2 S. E.
(2d) 876 (1939); Sayles, Adm'x v. Loftis, 217 N. C. 674, 9 S. E. (2d) 393
(1940).
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dictable consistency in the decisions. On occasion the court will go into
a lengthy discussion of the merits of the particular pleading being attacked by the motion. If the conclusion is that it constitutes part of the
pleader's cause of action or defense, it will remain because evidence to
support it may be presented at the trial ;4 otherwise it will be stricken.5
In other cases the court has announced. itself in opposition to a policy of
"charting the course of the trial in advance", and therefore has refused
to sustain a motion to strike without considering the question of the
relevancy of the attacked pleading. The protection afforded the moving
party where this procedure is followed lies in an objection to the evidence when presented at the trial.6
Why this diametrically opposite treatment? The reason is probably
founded on very practical considerations. Where the court allows or
disallows the motion after a discussion of the merits of the case, it does
so because it is sure of the ground on whi6h it treads; that is, there is
no doubt in the court's mind that the particular pleading is relevant or
irrelevant to the suit at hand.7 Or else, in rare cases, the court might
feel that the pleading is so worded as to make a profound impression
when read. to an .easily prejudiced jury, which would be definitely
harmful to the moving party.8 On the other hand, where the court
refuses to "chart the course of the trial in advance", it would seem
that it is uncertain, at least at the early stage in which such motion
arises, whether or not the pleading will be proper. 9 Consequently the
moving party is left to the adequate remedy of objecting to the evidence, if and when it is offered.
"When made in apt time, it (motion to strike) is not addressed to
the court's discretion, but is made as a matter of right." This rule is
found in numerous decisions.' 0 As contrasted with "discretion", it
would seem that "matter of right" should mean that the moving party
has a right to have his motion decided on the merits, from which decision either party can appeal. This is true where the motion is allowed,
'Scott v. Bryan, 210 N. C. 478, 187 S. E. 756 (1936); Barron v. Cain, 216

N. C. 282, 4 S. E. (2d) 618 (1939).
'Duke v. Crippled Childrens' Hospital, 214 N. C. 570, 199 S. E. 918 (1938);
Whitlow v. Southern Ry., 217 N. C. 558, 8 S. E. (2d) 809 (1940) ; Herndon v.
Massey, 217 N. C. 610, 8 S. E. (2d) 914 (1940); cf. Federal Reserve Bank v.
Atmore, 200 N. C. 437, 157 S. E. 129 (1931).
'Hardy v. Dahl, 209 N. C. 746, 184 S. E. 480 (1936) ; Hildebrand v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 216 N. C. 235, 4 S. E. (2d) 439 (1939).
"Cf. Duke v. Crippled Childrens' Hospital, 214 N. C. 570, 199 S. E. 918

(1938).

8Cf. Patterson v. Southern Ry., 214 N. C 38, 198 S. E. 364 (1938).
'Hardy v. Dahl, 209 N. C. 746, 184 S. E. 480 (1936); cf. Hildebrand v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 216 N. C. 235, 4 S. E. (2d) 439 (1939).
"0Federal Reserve Bank v. Atmore, 200 N. C. 437, 157 S. E. 129 (1931);
Poovey v. Hickory, 210 N. C. 630. 188 S. E. 78 (1936); Herndon v. Massey,
217 N. C. 610, 8 S. E. (2d) 914 (1940); cf. Fayetteville v. Spur Distilling Co.,
216 N. C. 596, 5 S. E. (2d) 838 (1939).
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for the Superior Court judge has necessarily made a "merit" decision
in order to have determined that the contested pleading is irrelevant.
The injured party may then except and immediately appeal. There is
no justifiable escape from this, for he may be entitled to have his lost
pleading remain and it would be most unfair to force him, against his
will, to go to the expense of continuing the trial to its end before he
is allowed to raise the point. For if he lost and then established his
right to material pleadings, the trial would have- been in vain. When
deciding such an appeal, the Supreme Court may determine the merits
12
of the case, 1 or refuse to chart the course of the trial in advance.
Either method, under these circumstances, will adequately protect the
injured party.
The problem, as it relates to appeals, is more difficult of solution
where the motion to strike is denied and the contested pleading remains.
In this situation, what is the meaning of the court's statement that the
motion is made as a "matter of right"? It seems to mean that the court
will either determine whether or not the pleading is relevant, 13 or will
refuse to chart the course of the trial in advance. 14 When this "chart"
rule is used, the only effect is to decide the motion itself by merely
postponing a decision as to the relevancy of the particular pleading.
The use of this rule appears to rest entirely in the Supreme Court, in
view of its policy of hearing immediate appeals. There is nothing to
indicate that any leeway has been given the Superior Court judge in
his invocation of this rule. He apparently is as liable to be reversed
when he invokes it as when he decides the motion on the merits.
Assuming that the North Carolina Court is going to continue its
use of the "chart" rule, it should grant the Superior Court judge wide
discretion in applying it, and allow no appeal from his ruling. Awareness of the possibilities of such a procedure may have caused the recently expressed doubt of the Supreme Court concerning the right of
immediate appeal where the motion is denied. 15 Overwhelming factors
argue against such an appeal. Although C. S. 638 allows an appeal
from every judicial order affecting a substantial right, such right is
I1Patterson v. Southern Ry., 214 N. C. 38, 198 S.E. 364 (1938) ; Whitlow v.
Southern Ry., 217 N. C. 558, 8 S. E. (2d) 809 (1940) ; cf. Federal Reserve Bank
v. Atnore,
200 N. C. 437, 157 S. E. 129 (1931).
"2 Hildebrand v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 216 N. C. 235, 4 S. E. (2d)

439 (1939).
"' Duke v. Crippled Childrens' Hospital, 214 N. C. 570, 199 S. E. 918 (1938);
Barron v. Cain, 216 N. C. 282, 4 S. E. (2d) 618 (1939); Sayles, Adm'x v.
Loftis, 217 N. C. 674, 9 S.E. (2d) 393 (1940).
",Pemberton v. Greensboro, 205 N. C. 599, 172 S. E. 196 (1934) ; Hardy v.
Dahl, 209 N. C. 746, 184 S. E. 480 (1936); cf. Virginia Trust Co. v. Dunlop,
214 N. C. 196, 198 S.E. (2d) 645 (1938).
"Virginia Trust Co. v. Dunlop, 214 N. C. 196, 198 S. E. 645 (1938); cf.
Scott v. Bryan, 210 N. C. 478, 187 S.E. 756 (1936).
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sufficiently protected by allowing the moving party to object to the evidence. The infrequent argument that the reading of the pleadings to
the jury will prejudice them seems, in actuality, rather negligible, for
juries apparently pay little attention to the pleadings when presented.16
Also it is possible that evidence may not be presented to support such
allegations. In view of the safeguards to the moving party, it seems
rather unfair to leave the other party without any choice but to submit
to the expense of defending such an unnecessary appeal. Since it is
apparent that the use of the motion to strike is becoming more frequent, and since, as it stands now, the discretion as to charting or not
charting the course of the trial is in the Supreme Court, thus necessitating their consideration of such appeals, their work will be burdened
with deciding an increasing number of questions which are of no material benefit. To refuse appeal in this situation would obviously remedy these problems, and would put the discretion in the Superior Court
judge where it rightfully belongs.
The "law of the case" is that a court, having ruled on a certain question, will not again hear the case upon the same point. 17 To what
extent does this pertain to motions to strike? On appeals, if the motion
is allowed, evidence to support the stricken allegations cannot be admitted, as the court has ruled on the merits that the particular pleading
is improper. However, this should not bar such evidence for a secondary purpose, such as impeachment of an adverse witness, for here
there would be no attempt to introduce it in support of the wrongful
allegations. On the other hand, where the court denies the motion on
its merits, it seems that the trial judge would be bound to allow the
evidence to come in. Where the "chart" rule is invoked, nothing has
been decided. Consequently the moving party must prepare to efend,
in view of a possible adverse ruling by the trial judge on his objection
to the evidence.
Often a party who has suffered an adverse ruling on a motion to
strike may feel that an immediate appeal is unnecessary or undesirable.
How should he protect himself so that he may have the privilege of
contesting the ruling in case he should lose his case and appeal? If
the Superior Court judge allows the motion the injured party must
except. Logically, an offer of the evidence at the trial should be unnecessary, for in allowing the motion, the judge has, in effect, ruled
that he will not admit the evidence, and consequently any offer of it
would be useless. However, a careful attorney, to show that he is
still relying on his exception and to prevent any question of his having
"8Cf. Poovey v. Hickory, 210 N. C. 630, 188 S. E. 78 (1936); Warren v.
Virginia
Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank, 214 N. C. 206, 198 S. E. 624 (1938).
17
MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1929) §28.
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waived his right to do so, should make some offer of the evidence that
he would like to prove under the stricken pleadings. Where the motion
is denied, the moving party's only remedy is to object to the evidence
when presented. If it is denied on the merits, the Superior Court
judge has made his decision to allow the evidence to come in. In this
situation the moving party should except to the denial and then object
to the evidence. If he does not except to the denial he may be considered to have waived his right to object to the evidence by acquiescing
in it; while if he fails to object to the evidence, he may, on appeal, be
considered to have waived his right to his exception to the denial. If
the judge denies the motion by invoking the "chart" rule, he is simply
deferring a decision on the question until the evidence is offered. Thus
it seems that the moving party would not have to except in order to
object to the evidence. However, in many instances the judge may give
no reason for his denial, and exception should be taken in all such cases
to prevent any subsequent contention that the judge's ruling was on
the merits.
In the interest of simplicity, and in order to clarify the difficult,
and in many cases unnecessary problems that develop from the use of
the motion to strike, it seems that it would be advantageous from both
the point of view of the court and of the parties litigant, for the court
to lay down the following set rule on motions to strike made in apt
time: (1) Where allowed, the aggrieved party may (a) except and
appeal immediately, and obtain a decision as to whether or not he may
support the contested allegations by evidence at the trial, or (b) except
to the ruling and be allowed to raise the question if the case is subsequently appealed, provided, at least, that he has preserved his exception
by offering the evidence at the trial. (2) Where denied, he may not
appeal, but must seek his relief by excepting to the ruling and objecting
to the evidence when and if it is offered.
J. B. CHESHIRE, IV.
Contracts-Effect of Second Contract With Defaulter Upon
Rights for Breach of First.
An elementary rule of contract law is that a party injured by a
breach of contract has a "duty"' to mitigate any damages suffered
'Strictly speaking the "duty" to mitigate damages is not a duty at all, not
an affirmative obligation. The rule merely sets up a standard for ascertainment of damages, recognizing a disability in the injured party to collect avoidable
damages. RaSTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §336, comment (d); 5 WILILISTON,
CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1937) 3795, 3813. In the interests of.brevity the word
"duty" is used throughout this note as qualified by this footnote.
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thereby.2 Yet, in a recent case8 where the injured party entered into a
second contract with the defaulting party, in order to dispose of products left on his hands by the breach, the court held that the second
contract "superseded and rescinded" the first, and thereby barred any
recovery of damages for breach of that contract. The majority reasoned
that since the two contracts were inconsistent with each other and performance of both was impossible, the first was abrogated by the second,
despite lack of an express provision to that effect. Thus, the court,
while recognizing the doctrine of mitigation of damages, interpreted
the making of the second contract as indicating no such intent, but
rather the intent to terminate all rights under the first contract. In a
vigorous dissent, one judge 4 contended that by virtue of the "duty" on
the injured party to mitigate damages resulting from the breach of the
first contract, he should be allowed to enter into the second contract with
the party in default without barring his rights to recover damages for
the former breach.
Cases involving employment contracts have often given rise to the
question of the effect of a subsequent contract on the rights of the parties to a breached contract. These cases arise where the employee has
been wrongfully discharged by his employer, who subsequently makes
an offer of re-employment. In view of the recognized "duty" to mitigate damages, it is usually held that if the best offer, within the limits
set up by the mitigation rule, comes from the defaulting employer, then
the employee must either accept or else forfeit a pro tanto amount of
the damages suffered. 5 Thus, these cases impliedly hold that the second
contract will not rescind the first.
'McCoamicx,
DAMAGES (1935) 127, 132; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932)
WILLIsToN, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1937) 3795, 3875.
'United States v. Brookridge Farm, Inc., 111 F. (2d) 461 (C. C. A. 10th,

§336 (1); 5

1940).
"Huxman, Circuit Judge; id. at 465. In the principal case another judge

dissented on the ground that damages should not be recoverable for breach of the

first contract because that contract was not one that could be enforced in court.

It seemed that there was no competition when the first contract was made, and
this judge was-of the idea that the seller had taken advantage of this fact to
charge the buyer, the United States, an exorbitant price for the goods. When
the second contract was made between the parties there was competition, and the

seller's bid for the second contract was approximately 30% less than his bid
for the first contract had been.

'Morris Shoe Co. v. Coleman, 187 Ky. 837, 221 S. W. 242 (1920); Flikema
v. Henry Kraker Co., 252 Mich. 406, 233 N. W. 362, 72 A. L. R. 1046 and note
(1930). However, this duty to re-accept employment is a qualified one, extending only to employment offered in good faith; Gray v. Pacific Suction Cleaner
Co., 171 Cal. 234, 155 Pac. 469 (1915); Schisler v. Perfection Milker Co., 193
Minn. 160, 258 N. W. 17 (1934); within the same general line of business;
Russellville Special School Dist. v. Tinsley, 156 Ark. 283, 245 S. W. 831 (1922) ;
Hussey v. Holloway, 217 Mass. 100, 104 N. E. 471 (1914); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1937) 3811; and not to an offer of re-employment more menial
than that for which he originally contracted; Cooper v. Stronge & Warner Co.,
111 Minn. 177, 126 N. W. 541 (1910); Connell v. Averill, 8 App. Div. 524, 40
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In one leading case,6 the seller refused to deliver goods to the buyer
on credit according to the contract, but. instead offered to deliver the
same goods at a reduced cash price. The court held that the buyer
should have mitigated his damages by accepting the new offer if he had
the cash and was unable to obtain similar goods elsewhere, but ruled
that the new contract did not terminate rights for 'damages under the
original contract. This decision was based upon dicta in Warren v.
Stoddart7 to the effect that when a buyer refused to accept a seller's
new cash offer, after breach of the original contract to ship goods on
30 days credit, then the buyer could recover only nominal damages for
the breach of that contract. Many courts treat a second contract with
the 'lefaulting party as a proper method of mitigating damages,8 refusing to allow recovery of damages that could have been, but were not,
N. Y. Supp. 855 (4th Dep't 1896); nor to work that would be degrading;

Buffalo Bayou Co. v. Lorentz, 177 S. W. 1183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915); Williams
v. School Dist., 104 Wash. 659, 177 Pac. 635 (1919); 3 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES
(4th Ed. 1916) 2564; offensive; Price v. Davis, 187 Mo. App. 113, 173 S. W.
64 (1915); 5 WI.LISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1937) 3798; or unreasonable;
Hirsch v. Georgia Iron & Coal Co., 169 Fed. 578 (C. C. A. 6th, 1909); 5
WII.UsToN, CONTRACTs (Rev. Ed. 1937) 3798; nor does it apply if he already
has another position; see Birdsong v. Ellis, 62 Miss. 418 (1884). Where the
new offer varies the terms of the original contract so that its acceptance would
force an abandonment of rights under the first agreement, there is no duty
on the discharged employee to accept; Morris Shoe Co. v: Coleman, 187 Ky.
837, 221 S. W. 242 (1920); Holloway v. Levine, 107 Vt. 396, 180 Atl. 889
(1935); 5 Wn.LisToN, CONTRAcTs (Rev. Ed. 1937) 3814; unless it expressly
stipulates that entrance into the new contract will not prejudice the employee's
rights under the first contract; Comey v. United Surety Co., 217 N. Y. 268, 111
N. E. 832 (1916). If, after a reasonable time the employee cannot locate equivalent employment, then he should accept work for which he is best suited;
Kramer v. Wolf Cigar Stores Co., 99 Tex. 597, 91 S. W. 775 (1906); retaining
of course his right to recover damages for the breach of the former contract.
'Lawrence v. Porter, 63 Fed. 62 (C. C. A. 6th, 1894).
7105 U. S. 224, 230, 26 L. Ed. 1117, 1120 (1882).
In Lawrence v. Porter,
id. at 67, Lurton, Circuit Judge, said of this case: "The opinion in Warren v.
Stoddart rests upon the theory that the buyer does not surrender or yield any
right of action he may have for the breach of contract. It rests wholly upon
the duty of mitigating the loss by replacing the goods by others, if they are
obtainable by reasonable exertion. If this duty be such as to require him to buy
from the delinquent seller; if the article can be obtained only from him, or
because he offers it cheaper than it can be obtained from others, such a purchase
from the seller is not an abandonment of the original contract by the substitution of another, nor would the purchase operate to the seller's advantage save
in so far as the damage resulting from his bad faith was thereby reduced. If
the seller offers to sell for cash at a reduced price, or to sell for a less price
than the market price, though in excess of the contract price, with the condition
that it should operate as a waiver of the original contract, or of any right of
action for its breach, then the buyer would not be obligated to treat with the
seller, nor would the seller's offer, if rejected, operate as a reduction of damages."
8 Key v. Kingwood Oil Co., 110 Okla. 178, 236 Pac. 598 (1925); Plesofsky
v. Kaufman & Flonacker, 140 Tenn. 208, 204 S. W. 204 (1918); Holloway v.
Levine, 107 Vt. 396, 180 At. 889 (1935); Stone v. United Fuel Gas Co., 111
W. Va. 569, 163 S. E. 48 (1932); 1 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES (4th Ed. 1916)
324; 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTs (Rev. Ed. 1937) 3876; See collection of cases
in Notes (1902) 54 L. R. A. 718, (1919) 1 A. L. R. 436, (1927) 46 A. L. R.
1192, (1931) 72 A. L. R. 1049.
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thus avoided, 9 and some of these expressly reject the idea that the
second contract is a rescission of the first, barring rights thereunder.10
The defaulter cannot escape liability under this rule by stipulating that
the acceptance of the new contract will be an abandonment of the
original right of action,"1 for the injured party need not accept such an
Conversely, some courts hold that entrance into a second contract,
inconsistent with an earlier one between the same parties, operates to
rescind the prior contract, and to extinguish the right to sue for the
breach of that contract.' 2 The reasoning applied is that the injured
party had an election either to enforce the original contract or relinquish his rights thereunder, and that by entering into the second contract he chose the latter course. 13 However, several of these decisions
may be distinguished from the principal case on the ground that there
had been no breach before the second contract was made.' 4 Frequently,
as in the principal case, courts will merely recite that contracts incon9Lawrence v. Porter, 63 Fed. 62 (C. C. A. 6th, 1894) ; Schisler v. Perfection
Milker Co., 193 Minn. 160, 258 N. W. 17 (1934); Hickey v. Perkins Dry Goods

Co., 229 S. W. 951 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921). It is often held that "all reasonable
steps" should be taken by the injured party to mitigate his damages; Gilson v.
Royster Guano Co., 1 F. (2d) 82 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1924) ; Payzu, Ltd. v. Saunders,
(1919) 2 K. B. 581, (1919) 18 MicHr. L. REv. 702; but it is ordinarily said that
it is not reasonable to require the injured party to borrow money in order to
accept the defaulting seller's offer to sell for cash when credit was contracted
for; Weber Implement Co. v. Acme Harvesting Mach. Co., 268 Mo. 363, 187
S. W. 874 (1916); Stanley Manly Boy's Clothes, Inc. v. Hickey, 113 Tex. 482,
259 S. W. 160 (1924). In instances where it is impossible to get the same
goods elsewhere; Lawrence v. Porter, 63 Fed. 62 (C. C. A. 6th, 1894); as in
public utilities; Henrici v. South Feather L. & W. Co., 177 Cal. 442, 170 Pac.
1135 (1918) ; Note, (1927) 46 A. L. R. 1192, 1195; or if a refusal to enter into
the second contract would greatly aggravate damages; Ingraham v. Pullman Co.,
190 Mass. 33, 76 N. E. 237 (1906); the courts are fairly consistent in holding
that there is a "duty" to enter into the second agreement with the party in
default, thus impliedly holding that the second contract would not of itself
rescind the former agreement and bar rights thereunder.
10 Comey v. United Surety Co., 217 N. Y. 268, 111 N. E. 832 (1916); Siegle
v. Hamilton-Carhartt Cotton Mills, 89 Okla. 68, 213 Pac. 305 (1923); Allen v.
Maronne, 93 Tenn. 161, 23 S. W. 113 (1893); 2 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES (4th
Ed. 1916) 2298.
11 Farmer's Co-operative Ass'n v. Shaw, 171 Okla. 358, 42 P. (2d) 887 (1935),
(1936) 20 MINN. L. Rav. 300; Holloway v. Levine, 107. Vt. 396, 180 Atl. 889
(1935); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1937) 3797, 3876.
offer.
" Wiley v. Dixie Oil Co., 43 F. (2d) 51 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930) ; McCabe Const.
Co. v. Utah Const. Co., 199 Fed. 976 (D. Ore. 1912); Arizona-Parral Mining
Co. v. Forbes, 16 Ariz. 395, 146 Pac. 504 (1915) ; Riverside Coal Co. v. American
Coal Co, 107 Conn. 40, 139 Atl. 276 (1927); McKay v. Fleming, 24 Colo. App.
380, 134 Pac. 159 (1913); Agel & Levine v. Patch Mfg. Co., 77 Vt. 13, 58
AtI. 792 (1904) ; Snowball v. Maney Bros., 39 Wyo. 84, 270 Pac. 167 (1928).
" Wood v. Brighton Mills, 297 Fed. 594 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1924) ; McCabe Const.
Co. v. Utah Const. Co., 199 Fed. 976 (D. Ore. 1912); McKay v. Fleming, 24
Colo. App. 380, 134 Pac. 159 (1913) ; Johnson v. Ford, 147 Tenn. 63, 245 S. W.
531 (1922).
14 Housekeeper Pub. Co. v. Swift, 97 Fed. 290 (C. C. A. 8th, 1899); Wiley
v. Dixie Oil Co., 43 F. (2d) 51 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930); Arizona-Parral Mining
Co. v. Forbes, 16 Ariz. 395, 146 Pac. 504 (1915).
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sistent with each other cannot stand together since performance of one
renders performance of the other impossible, 15 ignoring the possibility
that a right of action remains and the entering of the second contract
was in mitigation of damages. 16
It is true that performance of the second contract renders performance of the original contract impossible, but the injured party
agrees to the second contract only after the other party has, by repudiation, made it plain that the original contract will not be performed.
When there is no breach of the first agreement, it is but reasonable to
assume that the second agreement, inconsistent with the first, was intended to replace it and indicate a rescission of the first contract. In
such a case the making of the new agreement caused the first one not
to be performed, so that the non-perfoirnance can be called consensual.
But where the new- agreement was made only after such a repudiation
by one party as to indicate that the original agreement was not to be
carried out, then the new agreement should not indicate any intent to
rescind its predecessor. Rather, the repudiation is the reasonable explanation of the non-performance of the original contract, and the new
agreement made after the repudiation appears to be not a consent to
the non-performance, but a device adopted by the parties to meet a
situation where non-performance of the earlier agreement was already
assured. It is true, as said by the court in the principal case, that the
injured party entered into the new agreement because he felt that it
was the best course for him to follow under the circumstances, but this
statement is equally true of all mitigation arrangements. Performance
of both contracts in such a situation, while impossible, is no more impossible than performance of both where the injured party has contracted with a third party rather than the -defaulter, yet the courts
never speak of impossibility in the latter case. A contract with a third
party is the usual method of mitigating damages,' 7 and no court contends that such a contract ipso facto bars the injured party's rights to
recover for breach of the prior contract.
" Housekeeper" Pub. Co. v. Swift, 97 Fed. 290 (C. C. A. 8th, 1899) ; McCabe
Const. Co. v. Utah Const. Co., 199 Fed. 976 (D. Ore. 1912); McKay v. Fleming, 24 Colo. App. 380, 134 Pac. 159 (1913); 2 BLACK, RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION (1916) 1249.
"eSome few courts consider and expressly reject the mitigation of damages
doctrine, especially in employment contracts where it is usually held that to
accept re-employment at less wages than those contracted for would be an
abandonment of the original right of action, regardless of the "duty" to mitigate
damages. McCabe Const. Co. v. Utah Const. Co., 199 Fed. 976 (D. Ore. 1912) ;
People's Co-operative Ass'n v. Lloyd, 77 Ala. 387 (1884) ; Trawick v. Peoria
& Ft. C. Ry., 68 II1. App. 156 (1896); Moore v. Yazoo & M. V. R. R., 176 Miss.

65, 166 So. 395 (1936); 3

SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES

(4th Ed. 1916) 2557.

" RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §336, comment (a); 1 SUTHERLAND,
DAMAGES (4th Ed. 1916) 324; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1937) §§1353,
1385.
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Although the Restatement of Contracts' 8 provides that "A contract
containing a term inconsistent with a term of an earlier contract between the same parties is interpreted as including an agreement to
rescind the inconsistent terms of the earlier agreement.. .", this has no
express application after a breach of the first contract. Where there
has been no breach of the first contract, the generally recognized doctrine of novation, or substitution of contracts, will apply.' 9 Seemingly
it is this rule to which the Restatement refers.
It appears unreasonably paradoxical to hold that a party injured by
a breach of contract is precluded from recovering damages by virtue
of entrance into a second contract with the defaulter, when under a
court-made rule he has a "duty" to mitigate his damages, and his best
opportunity lies in the form of a new offer from the party in default.
Surely no court could hold that after a seller breached a contract for
the sale of goods for $1,000, yet offers to sell the same goods to the
buyer for $1,100, the buyer could buy from a third party for $1,250
and then recover $250 from the seller for the breach! Thus, some
courts would reach the strange conclusion that if the buyer did not
enter into the second contract with the defaulter he could recover only
a part of his damages, while if he did enter into the second contract
he could not recover any of his damages.20 'If the second contract is allowed without a waiver of the right to sue for damages, the original
contract between the parties would in effect be enforced, as the buyer
could recover any differential. Since the courts impose a "duty" to
mitigate damages after a breach of" contract, it seems highly desirable
to allow the achievement of this by entrance into a second contract with
the 'defaulter, especially where this appears to be the most effective
method of minimization, yet to preserve the right to recover any damages ensuing from the breach of the first contract unless there is an
express waiver of such right. Such a decision as the instant one leaves
a court enmeshed in contradictory cross-purposes.
Due to the conflict of decisions, it seems that the best available
assurance that the second contract may be entered into safely, is to
provide expressly therein that such contract is not to be construed as
18
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §408.
" Housekeeper Pub. Co. v. Swift, 97 Fed. 290 (C. C. A. 8th, 1899) ; Wiley v.
Dixie Oil Co., 43 F. (2d) 51 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930); Arizona-Parral Mining Co.
v. Forbes, 16 Ariz. 395, 146 Pac. 504 (1915); 1 BLACK, RESCISSION AND CArCELLATION (1916) 11.
"0Compare Deere v. Lewis, 51 Ill. 254 (1869), with Trawick v. Peoria & Ft.
C. Ry., 68 Ill. App. 156 (1896); Birdsong v. Ellis, 62 Miss. 418 (1884), with

Moore v. Yazoo & M. V. R. R., 176 Miss. 65, 166 So. 395 (1936); Plesofsky v.
Kaufman & Flonacker, 140 Tenn. 208, 204 S. W. 204 (1918), with Johnson v,
Ford, 147 Tenn. 63, 245 S. W. 531 (1922).
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a waiver or abandonment of any rights which have accrued under the
P. DALTON KENNEDY, JR.
breached contract .2 1
Constitutional Law-Police Power-Municipal Prohibition
of House to House Peddling.
A Georgia city, having statutory authority to "license, regulate and
control ... peddlers of all kinds," 1 declared by ordinance that every
solicitor, peddler, hawker, itinerant merchant and transient vendor of
merchandise, who went uninvited to a private home for the purpose of
conducting business, was a (public) nuisante. 2 Held, such an unqualified provision is an unreasonable and arbitrary interference with legal
rights, in violation of the due process clause of the Federal Constitution.3
A preliminary question to be decided in every such case is: Has the
legislature given the municipality power to pass such a law? This is
of particular significance in that courts seem to find an affirmative
grant of power a persuasive argument for constitutional validity. For,
ordinances identical to the one under consideration have been upheld
in all cases when passed by cities granted the specific power to "prohibit" hawkers and peddlers. 4 Likewise, this ordinance has been upheld in the only case arising where passed by another city under the
delegated power to "regulate" similar activities. 5 Whenever a city
had neither the power to regulate nor suppress this business, such an
21In Comey v. United Surety Co., 217 N. Y. 268, 111 N. E. 832 (1916),
Cardozo, J., said of such an express provision in the second contract: "The contract itself . .. says in so many words that the old contract is not to be deemed
revived, and that no rights that have accrued under it are waived. The cause of
action against the defendant was thus plainly preserved." Even such an express
reservation might leave some room for argument if the language of Mr. Justice

White in International Contracting Co. v. Lamont, 155 U. S. 303, 15 Sup.
39 L. Ed. 160 (1894), is to be taken literally. In that case it was said, at
"A party cannot avoid the legal consequences of his acts by protesting
time he does them that he does not intend to subject himself to such
quences."
'LAws
OF GEORGIA 1901, Part III, Title I, Sect. 37.
2

Ct. 97,
p. 310,
at the
conse-

This ordinance is identical with that originated by Green River, Wyoming,
and upheld in Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 10th,

1933).

3 De Berry v. La Grange, 8 S.E. (2d) 146 (Ga. App. 1940).
'Green River v4 Fuller Brush Co., 65 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933)
rev'g 60 F. (2d) 613 (D. C. Wyo. 1932); 1cCormick v. Montrose, 99 P. (2d)
969 (Colo. 1940) (court used this reasoning) ; cf. Goodrich v. Busse, 247 Ill. 366,
93 N. E. 292 (1910) (similar ordinance upheld for this reason).
I Shreveport v. Cunningham, 190 La. 481, 182 So. 649 (1938). Accord: Ex
Parte Camp, 38 Wash. 393, 80 Pac. 547, 548 (1905). But cf. Cosgrove v. City
Council, 103 Ga. 835, 31 S.E. 445 (1898) ; Good Humor v. Board of Comm'rs., 124
N. J.L. 162, 11 A. (2d) 113 (1940) ; Virgo v. Toronto, 22 Can. Sup. Ct. 447
(1893) (passing on similar ordinances).
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ordinance has been held invalid.6 However, this distinction is rarely
articulated by the courts.
It is frequently questioned whether such activity actually constitutes a public nuisance. Although a public nuisance is indictable, a
visitation which merely offends a householder may be only a private
nuisance and not punishable as a crime. Cities cannot by ordinance
7
declare to be a public nuisance that which is not one in substance.
Although one solicitation may not, of itself, be such a nuisance as to
be punishable, the types of salesmen prohibited by the ordinance in
question are increasing to such an extent that each uninvited visit may
be deemed a public nuisance because of the frequent repetition of calls
by one solicitor after another. Such annoyances have become so general and common that a court has taken judicial notice that the frequent ringing of doorbells of private residences by the prohibited persons is in fact a nuisance to the occupants of homes. 8 After all, the
terms "public" and "private" are but labels descriptive of conclusions
yet given as reasons for decisions. In the final analysis, the problem
is whether the courts feel that there exists a public need of suppression
so as to empower the city to pass such an ordinance:
Aside from the question of authorization, the validity of such an
ordinance is usually, and particularly in a case of this nature, held
to depend upon its being a proper exercise of police power. Of necessity this power is one of indefinable flexibility, and represents an everchanging compromise in a "contest between the restraining power of
due process of law and the legitimizing energy of police control." 0 In
its liberal preient-day scope, it has been said to include interference
'Prior v. White, 132 Fla. 1, 180 So. 347 (1938) ; Jewel Tea Co. v. Bel Air,
172 Md. 536, 192 Ati. 417 (1937) (court used this reasoning) ; McAlester v. Tea
Co., 98 P. (2d) 924 (Okla. 1940) (court used this reasoning); Orangeburg v.
Farmer, 181 S. C. 143, 186 S. E. 783 (1936); White v. Culpeper, 172 Va. 630,
1 S. E. (2d) 269 (1939).
'Prior v. White, 132 Fla. 1, 180 So. 347 (1938); McAlester v. Tea Co.,
98 P. (2d) 924 (Okla. 1940); White v. Culpeper, 172 Va. 630, 1 S. E. (2d)
269 (1939). But see McCormick v. Montrose, 99 P. (2d) 969, 972 (Colo.
1940); 1 Bisnop, CramINAL LAW (9th ed. 1923) §234 ("whenever the public
deems an act of private wrong to be of a nature requiring its intervention for
the protection of the individual, it holds the act punishable at its own suit; in
other words, makes it a crime").
' Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933).
The prohibited persons frequently claim exemption from the ordinhnce on grounds
of implied invitation to call, and because usage and custom would constitute them
at least licensees. However, the ordinance simply abolishes existing implied
consent, if any, and creates a presumption of lack of consent ,intil an invitation
can be shown. Each householder may withdraw consent at any time and so
constitute persons entering, trespassers; it would be a strange anomaly in our
law if the people individually could accomplish an act which they could not do
collectively through their government. McCormick v. Montrose, 99 P. (2d)
969, 974 (Colo. 1940) ; see Windsor v. Blake, 49 N. C. 332, 334 (1875).
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by the state wherever the public interests require it, since the government is obligated to protect and promote the public welfare.10 A
profitable comparison may be made between the instant ordinance and
past exercises of the police power which received judicial approval.
Hawkers and peddlers have been confined to certain districts ;11 the
ordinance in question forbids uninvited visitation of private homes.
The sale of drugs or medicines by itinerants has been forbidden;12
whereas the ordinance regulates not what is sold but only the place
of sale. To promote public order and comfort, itinerants have been
forbidden to sell within certain distances of religious meetings and
fairs.' 3 Are not people in their homes entitled to like consideration?
Since entering private premises against the consent of the owner
may be forbidden, 14 it appears that a majority of the people, acting
through their representatives, might decree any vendor's entrance to be
againat the consent of the owner, until an actual invitation is obtained.
Zoning laws go further than the ordinance in question inasmuch as
they prevent one from using his own property for certain purposes, 15
while the ordinance at issue merely declares that one shall not use
another's property for his own business purposes without the invitation
of the owner.
In Williams v. Arkansas,16 the United States Supreme Court held
valid a statute making it unlawful to solicit business on the trains or
in the depots of any railroad operating within the state, and unlawful
for any railroad knowingly to permit such practices. Certainly people
in their own homes are entitled to as much protection against unpleasantness and annoyance as those who travel, especially as the'latter
voluntarily expose themselves to business contacts, while the individual
in the home seeks escape from uninvited disturbance. The ordinance
in the principal case is not as stringent as that upheld by the above
10

Fuller Brush v. Green River, 60 F. (2d)

COOLEY,

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

613, 615 (D. Wyo. 1932); 2

(8th ed. 1927) 1226 ("The

-public need

is the polestar of the enactment, interpretation, and application of the law.").
" Ex parte Hogg, 70 Tex. Crim. Rep. 161, 156 S. W. 931 (1913); Stevens
Point v. Bocksenbaum, 225 Wis. 373, 274 N. W. 505 (1937); see Ex parte
Camp, 38 Wash. 393, 395, 80 Pac. 547, 548 (1905); Note (1936) 105 A. L. R,

1051.
" Notes (1928) 54 A. L. R. 730, 735.

1" State v. Reynolds, 77 Conn. 131, 58 Ad. 755 (1904) ; Meyers v. Baker, 120
Ill. 567, 12 N. E. 79 (1887) ; State v. Cate, 58 N. H. 240 (1878); State v.
Stoval, 103 N. C. 416, 8 S.E. 900 (1889) ; State v. Read, 12 R. I. 137 (1879).
" McCormick v. Montrose, 99 P. (2d) 969, 975 (Colo. 1940); Saxton v.
Peoria, 75 Il1. App. 397 (1897) ; Brownsville v. Cook, 4 Neb. 101 (1875) ; State
v. Glenn, 118 N. C. 1194, 23 S. E. 1004 (1896).
15 Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U. S. 171, 35 Sup. -Ct. 171, 59 L. ed. 900
(1914); Hadacheck v. Sebastien, 239 U. S. 394, 36 Sup. Ct. 143, 60 L. ed. 348
(1915); Texas Co. v. Tampa, 100 F. (2d) 347 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938); 2 COOLEY,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 1315 (zoning laws upheld).

" 217 U. S. 79, 30 Sup. Ct. 493, 54 L. ed. 673 (1910), aff'g 85 Ark. 464, 108
S. W. 838 (1908).
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decision, since it reserves to the householder the power to invite the
prohibited persons for any desired business. It has been said that all
lawful occupations are subject to reasonable regulations, including
licensing, and a recognized mode of regulation is by prescribing the
places where a given occupation may or may not be conducted. 1 The
ordinance in the principal case does not suppress the business of
peddling, but merely prohibits a particular phase of it in an effort to
protect the privacy of homes.
Some courts insist that if the law seeks to relieve the occupant of
the house from disturbance, then it is not sufficiently comprehensive
because it fails to cover solicitors of alms and charity. 1 8 However,
a state may, without arbitrary discrimination, direct its laws against
what it deems the existing evil, without covering the whole field of
possible abuses.' 9 And here there seems ample reason for the discrimination so as to constitute no denial of equal protection. Certainly the prohibited class is a conspicuous example of what the legislative body seeks to prevent. Solicitors of alms appear less frequently
than hawkers and peddlers and a householder is ordinarily more willing
to hear charitable requests than to be urged to buy something he does
not desire sufficiently to invite the seller onto his premises. Where
home-merchants are specifically exempted from the application of ordinances like the one in question, courts have found discrimination;20
but in the principal ordinance there is no such discrimination because
resident merchants are subject to the same restrictions.
The constitutionality of the law when applied to solicitors for outof-state firms hinges upon whether such prohibition is a direct burden
on interstate commerce. In Green River v. Fuller Brush Co.,21 the
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an identical ordinance saying that
interstate commerce was only indirectly affected, and that the commerce
clause did not prevent the state from exercising its police power, at
least in the absence of Congressional regulation. A regulation discriminating against interstate commerce or designed to gain local
benefit at its expense, is almost invariably invalidated as a direct burden. 2 However, the fact that its subject matter is one not requiring
27EX parte Quong Wo, 161 Cal. 220, 118 Pac. 714 (1911)
(and cases cited);
ex Parte Barmore, 174 Cal. 286, 163 Pac. 50 (1917). (D. C. Wyo. 1932).
'8Fuller Brush v. Green River, 60 F. (2d) 613
29 Green River v. Bunger, 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P. (2d) 456 (1936) (citing Central
Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 160, 33 Sup. Ct. 66, 67, 57 L. ed.
164 20(1912)); 2 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 1226.
Jewel Tea Co. v. Bel Air, 172 Md. 536, 192 Atl. 417 (1937) (identical
ordinance with additional clause exempting home-merchants); Good Humor v.
Board of Comm'rs., 124 N. J. L. 162, 11 A. (2d) 113 (1940), rev'g. 123 N. J. L.
21, 7 A. (2d) 824 (Sup. Ct., 1939).
2165 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933).
Carolina State Highway Dep't. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177,
185, 58 Sup. Ct. 510, 82 L. ed. 734, 739 (1937) (and cases cited) ; ROTSCHAEFER,
CONSTITUTIOxAL LAW (1939) 283.
22South
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uniformity of national regulation is frequently relied upon to support
Reguregulation which only affects interstate commerce incidentally.
lation accomplished by the instant ordinance seems purely a matter
of local interest, and one which affects interstate commerce only indirectly. It has been said that this type of ordinance is not aimed at
the solicitation of orders for purchase of goods which flow through
interstate commerce, but at the "place" of solicitation.2 4 The ordinance does not prohibit the former, but only the latter.
In the principal case, appellant pleaded that his constitutional rights
as a Jehovah's Witness were contravened by the ordinance.2 5 Admittedly a deprivation of the right to propogate religious belief is
unconstitutional.2 6 Yet the same clause of the Constitution also protects all from having religious beliefs of others thrust upon them against
their willY7 The Constitution does not guarantee protection to the
form of worship of a particular sect. 28 In neither the principal decision
nor in other decisions involving similar ordinances has there been any
discussion of freedom of worship. For it seems that the constitutional
guaranty of such freedom does not insure the right to sell from house
to house as the appellant was attempting to do.
Since all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a law, the Georgia Court in the principal case
might well have reached an opposite conclusion. Furthermore, there
is a growing need for upholding such ordinances, since it is a matter
of common knowledge that the restricted types of persons are noticeably
increasing, to the annoyance, inconvenience, and disturbance of the
public' in their homes, against which private redress is of slight value
as a remedy. This ordinance does not prohibit business; rather it
regulates the "place" of carrying it on. There are numerous ways of
obtaining the required invitation if the property owner is really interested in the merchandise.
HARvWY A. JONAS, JR.
"' South Carolina State Highway Dep't. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177,
58 Sup. Ct. 510, 82 L. ed. 734 (1937); cf. Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 216 N. C.
115, 3 S. E. (2d) 292 (1939); Note (1939) 18 N. C. L. REv. 48 (direct or
indirect burden of taxation on interstate commerce).
"' Green River v. Fuller Brush, 65 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933) ; Green
River v. Bunger, 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P. (2d) 456 (1936); cf. Real Silk Hosiery
Mills v. Portland, 268 U. S. 325, 45 Sup. Ct. 525, 69 L. ed. 982 (1925) (license
tax and examination required by ordinance for purpose of preventing fraud,
declared
direct burden on interstate commerce).
2
r De Berry v. La Grange. In appellant's brief, pp. 21 to 42, he pleaded
that his sect's Biblical Principle commanded him to go to everyone with the
scriptures, and that this ordinance prohibited that practice.
28 2 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 969.

Pittsburgh v. Ruffner, 134 Pa. Super. 192, 4 A. (2d) 224, 227 (1939);
2 COOLpY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 969, n. 1.
" Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 10 Sup. Ct. 299, 33 L. ed. 637 (1890);
Maplewood Township v. Albright, 13 N. J. Misc. 46, 176 Atl. 194 (C. 'P.,
1934); McMasters v. State, 21 Okla. Cr. 318, 207 Pac. 566 (1922).
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Constitutional Law-Validity of Parking Meter Ordinances
The North Carolina Supreme Court recently held that a parking
meter ordinance exceeded the power of a municipality to regulate parking.1 The court decided that there was no substantial relation between
the meter charge and the prevention of parking for an unreasonable
length of time; that the meter charge was not a proper inspection fee;
that the power to regulate did not authorize the imposition of a tax
upon the privilege sought to be regulated; and that the ordinance violated a statute restricting municipal license fees on operating motor vehicles to $1.00.
In -determining the validity of parking meter ordinances, the following questions have arisen :2
Does a Municipality Have the Power to Charge a License Fee as a
Reasonable Means of Regulating Parking?
The authority of a municipality to regulate parking is universally
recognized, whether such authority be derived from statutes authorizing regulation of traffic and the use of the streets3 or specifically authorizing the regulation of parking. 4 The standards of reasonable regulation
are fundamentally the same in both instances, the courts upholding only
those regulations which have a substantial relation to traffic safety.5
'Rhodes, Inc. v. Raleigh, 217 N. C. 627, 9 S. E. 389 (1940).
2 Problems, other than those discussed, presented by the parking meter cases
are: (a) Does a municipality have power to pledge revenue from parking meters
to pay for their purchase and installation? By the great weight of authority this
power exists: Franklin Trust Co. v. Loveland, 3 F.(2d) 114 (CCA 8th 1924);
Ward v. Chicago, 342 Ill. 167, 173 N. E. 810 (1930); Brockenbrough v. Water
Comm'rs., 134 N. C. 1, 46 S. E. 28 (1903) (pledge of tolls or rents from waterworks to pay for their installation). But see Brodkey v. Sioux City, 291 N. W.
171, 175 (Iowa 1940) (a parking meter case) "We have affirmed the rule that
the pledging by a city of revenue is unauthorized in absence of specific statutory
authority"; Van Eaton v. Sidney, 211 Iowa 986, 231 N. W. 475, 71 A. L. R. 820
(1930). (b) May a municipality delegate to a commissioner the power to install
meters at his discretion and regulate their use? See Brodkey v. Sioux City, 291
N. W. 171, 173 (Iowa 1940). (c)Is the licensing of the exclusive use of parking
meter spaces for one hour a leasing of property dedicated to public use? See
Birmingham v. Hood-McPherson Realty Co., 233 Ala. 352, 172 So. 114, 116
(1937) (suggesting that such exclusive use would be a leasing) ; cf. Schilling v,
Melbourne (1928), Vict. L. R. 302, 16 B. R. C. 45 (holding an ordinance invalid
which purported to permit drivers to park vehicles in certain designated street
zones for one shilling per day). But see In re Opinion of Justices, 8 N. E. (2d)
179, 182 (Mass. 1937).
'State ex rel. Harkow v. McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314 (1936) ; Rhodes,
Inc., v. Raleigh, 217 N. C. 627, 9 S.E. (2d) 389 (1940). See cases cited infra
note 6.
' Clark v. New Castle, 32 D. & C. 371 (Pa. 1938) ; County Court of Webster
County v. Roman, 3 S.E. (2d) 631 (W. Va. 1939). Notice that the N. Y. VFHICLE CODE, §54, as amended by N. Y. Pub. Laws of 1937, c. 502, specifically
authorizes use of parking meters in municipal traffic regulation.
'District of Columbia v. Smith, 68 App. D. C. 104, 93 F. (2d) 650 (1937)
(upholding an ordinance prohibiting parking between 2 a.m. and 8 p.m. to facilitate snow removal); State v. Carter, 205 N. C. 761, 172 S. E. 415 (1934);
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A decided majority6 of the parking meter decisions have upheld the
meter fee as a reasonable means of regulating parking, if imposed in a
zone in which municipal regulation for parking is permitted, ruling, in
effect, that "... whatever tends to make regulation effective is a
proper exercise of that power. It justifies the charge of a fee and the
'7
imposition of a penalty.
The opposite and minority view is expressed by the Rhode Island
court, which held that without specific delegation of authority a municipality could not exact a fee for parking, since a statute delegating
power to regulate parking ". . cannot be enlarged by implication unless that is necessary to make the statute effective and to accomplish its
object."'
The instant case did not question the power of a municipality generally to secure regulation by means of a license fee although the power
to license is not specifically delegated. Instead, it was held that a municipality had no power to impose a particular license fee which neither
bore a "substantial relation" to parking regulation, nor constituted a
proper license fee; hence, the court concluded that it must be an excise
tax, and as such could not be imposed under the police power to regulate parking. 9
Is the Revenue Derived So Excessive As to Make the Ordinance a
Taxing Measure?
Few cities have express authority to tax the use of city streets for
revenue. Where this power exists, however, an ordinance imposing a
tax upon parking would seem valid.Y0 But where a parking meter orWonewoc v. Taubert, 203 Wis. 73, 233 N, W. 755, 72 A. L. R. 229 (1930)

(up-

holding an ordinance prescribing manner of parking).
' State ex rel. Harkow v. McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314 (1936) ; In re
Opinion of Justices, 8 N. E. (2d) 179 (Mass. 1937) ; Hendricks v. Minneapolis,
290 N. W. 427 (Minn. 1940) ; Gilsey Bldgs., Inc., v. Great Neck Plaza, 170 Misc.
945, 11 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 694 (Sup. Ct., 1939) ; Ex parte Duncan, 179 Okla. 355,
65 P.(2d) 1015 (1937) ; Clark v. New Castle, 32 D. & C. 371 (Pa. 1938) ; Owens
v. Owens, 8 S. E. (2d) 339 (S. C. 1940); Harper v. Wichita Falls, 105 S. W.
(2d) 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Ex parte Harrison, 122 S. W. (2d) 314 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1938); County Court v. Roman, 3 S.. E. (2d) 631 (W. Va. 1939)
(strong dissenting opinion by Fox, President). Contra: Birmingham v. HoodMcPherson Realty Co., 233 Ala. 352, 172 So. 114 (1937); Rhodes, Inc., v. Raleigh, 217 N. C. 627, 9 S. E. (2d) 389 (1940) ; In re Opinion to House of Representatives, 9 R. I. 94, 5 A.(2d) 455 (1939).
' Buffalo v. Stevenson,- 207 N. Y. 258, 100 N. E. 798 (1913) (upholding municipal ordinance requiring a paid -permit to open any city street to connect with
a sewer, water, or power main).
8 59 R. I. 94, 5 A. (2d) 455, 457 (1939)
(italics supplied) ; see dissenting opinion in County Court of Webster County v. Roman, 3 S. E. (2d) 631, 634 (W. Va.

1939); 1 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) §237.
' Rhodes, Inc., v. Raleigh, 217 N. C. 627, 630, 9 S. E. (2d) 389, 391 (1940).
"0A license fee on the operation of a motor vehicle imposed by a !.ome rule
city in Ohio has been upheld as a valid excise tax under OHio CoNSTr.. art. XVIII.
§3; Saviers v. Smith, 101 Ohio St. 132, 128 N. E. 269 (1920). Accord: State
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tdinance is passed as a regulatory measure under the police power, no
greater fee should be charged than is necessary to cover the costs of
supplying the privilege and regulating its use." For a municipality
cannot under "the guise of a police regulation impose a revenue tax
12
where it has no authority to impose a revenue tax.'
But courts give great weight to the presumption that a license fee
is reasonable ;13 this may be overcome only by showing a glaring discrepancy between revenue and administrative costs.' 4 The burden of

proving such discrepancy rests upon the complainant, and necessitates
proof not only of the revenue of the meters and the expense of installing them but proof of all the expenses of regulating parking.'" The
courts have indicated that they may consider expenses of police patrolling, costs of maintaining records, possible liability for torts arising
from parking supervision, and, perhaps, loss by wear on the roads as
among those "incidental expenses."' 0 Thus, it is not surprising that
only one court to date has ruled the parking meter ordinance invalid
because of excessive revenue,17 and that a Florida case sustained a
parking meter ordinance which brought a township $55,000 annual
revenue as opposed to $4,000 annual expenses for maintaining meters.18
The question of reasonable revenue was never raised in the principal
case, although in their nine months of operation Raleigh's parking meters, installed for $10,000, collected a total revenue of $11,494.19
It is 'interesting to speculate upon the possible decisions of these
courts should a glaring 'discrepancy be revealed between the revenue
from the meters and the expenses of administration over a substantial
ex rel. Zielonka v. Carrel, 97 Ohio St. 220, 124 N. E. 134 (1939) (recognizing
the power of home rule cities in Ohio to place an excise tax on occupations).
Note (1938) OHIO STATE Unv. L. J. 198 (discussing parking meter fees as an
excise tax).
"In re Opinion of Justices, 8 N. E. (2d) 179 (Mass. 1937) ; Ex parte Duncan, 179 Okla. 355, 65 P.(2d) 1015 (1937); Ex parte Harrison, 122 S. W. (2d)
314 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938). 3 MCQUILLAN, MUNIcIPAL COPORATIONS (2d ed.
1928) 1089, 1102.
" 4 CooTEY, TAxATI oN (4th ed. 1924) §1680. Accord: State v. Beam, 91 N. C.
554 (1884).
"sState ex rel. Harkow v. McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314 (1936); Ex
Sparte Holt, 74 Okla. 226, 178 Pac. 260 (1918); Clark v. New Castle, 32 D. & C.
371 (Pa. 1937); Gilsey Bldgs. v. Great Neck Plaza, 170 Misc. 945, 11 N. Y.
Supp. (2d) 694 (Sup. Ct., 1939). 2 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIoNs (5th ed.
1911) §672.
"'Atkins v. Phillips, 26 Fla. 433, 8 So. 409 (1918) ; State ex rel. Harkow v.
McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314 (1936) ; Van Baolen v. People, .40 Mich. 258
(1878).
2 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CoR'PORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) §592.
15 See cases cited infra note 18.
"State ex rel. Harkow v. McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314, 317 (1936);
Hendricks v. Minneapolis, 290 N. W. 428, 430 (Minn. 1940); Clark v. Newr
Castle,
32 D. & C. 371, 381 (Pa. 1938).
'T Brodkey v. Sioux City, 291 N.
W. 171 (Iowa 1940).
"State ex rel. Harkow v. McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314 (1936) ; American City, Aug., 1936, p. 56.
" Popular Government, July-Aug., 1940, p. 11.
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period of time. 20 For there is authority that a municipal ordinance will
not be impeached because "incidentally the city's receipts of moneys
are increased," unless this increment is so excessive as to indicate that
the ordinance was literally passed "for tax purposes." 2 1 Furthermore,
most courts regard the parking fee as having a regulatory force. Clark
v. New Castle states: "The novel feature of the parking device is that
not only does the nickel toll pay the cost of regulation, but it is the
nickel itself which regulates. Rather than pay the nickel the motorist
will park elsewhere than in the restricted street, or will cut his stay
22
short."
If it can be proved that a smaller fee would not effectively accomplish regulation, a fee yielding excessive revenue might escape invalidity, as being necessary for effective regulation. But if the court should
find, as it did in the principal case, that the ordinance "does not depend
in any way upon the meter charge, but, as heretofore, upon a specification of the period during which it is lawful to park," 23 this contention,
resting upon a contrary presumption, necessarily fails.
Is the Installation of Parking Meters an UnwarrantedInvasion of the
Public's Right to Free and Unobstructed Use of the Streets?
In as much as the right of passage is subject to reasonable regulation,24 any permanent obstructions on the highway designed to promote
such regulation, such as sign posts, elevated safety zones, and stop
signs, are permissible. Thus, the parking meter device if reasonably
designed to promote traffic regulation would not be an actionable nuisance per se 5 The public's right to free passage is generally considered
an absolute right which cannot be subjected to charge by municipalities. 26 Parking, however, is generally defined as a mere privilege, incident to this right of passage and free use of the streets.2 7 Thus, it is
"Recent reports of parking meter revenues suggest that they are producing
revenue far in excess of administrative costs: American City, May, 1936, p. 87;
July, 1939,.p. 53; June, 1940, p. 46; Oct., 1940, p. 13, 99. Notes (1937) 22 IowA
LAw REv. 713; (1937-38) 4 Onio L. J. 198; (1939) 3 UNIv. DmoI L. J. 22.
' See Van Baolen v. People, 40 Mich. 258 (1879) ; cf. Mankato v. Fowler,
32 Minn. 364, 20 N. W. 361 (1884) ; see Atkins v. Phillips, 26 Fla. 281, 302 So.
429, 432 (1890); see State ex rel. Harkow v. McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So.
314, 317 (1936); note (1931) 75 A.L.R. 17 and cases cited.
- 32 D. & C. 371, 378 (Pa. 1937); cf. Harper v. Wichita Falls, 105 S. W.
(2d) 150 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). For reports of effect of parking meters on
traffic safety see citations infra note 50.
22 Rhodes

v. Raleigh, 217 N. C. 627, 631, 9 S. E. (2d) 389, 391 (1940).

2, See State ex rel. Harkow v. McCarthy, 126 .Fla. 433, 171 So. 314, 316
(1936) ; 2 ELLioTT, ROADS AND STREETS (4th ed. 1926) §828.
2"See In re Opinion of Justices, 8 N. E. (2d)
179, 181 (Mass. 1937).
"See Harper v. Wichita Falls, 105 S. W. (2d) 743, 750 (Tex. Civ. App.

1937). See note 27, supra.
27 Owens v. Owens, 8 S. E. (2d) 339, 343 (S. C. 1940) ; see Harper v. Wichita
Falls, 105 S. W. 743, 750 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). Accord: Welsh v. Morristown,
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analogous to the privileged use of the streets by taxis, busses, and carriers, which may be charged a license fee independent of the limited
license fee upon all motor vehicles. 28 This rather elusive distinction is
clearly recognized in Ex parte Duncan.29 There the court declared that
a statutory restriction on a municipality's power to license the free use
of the public highways did not forbid a license fee on the privilege of
parking. However, the North Carolina court has interpreted a statute
limiting the fee a municipality may impose upon the privilege of operating a motor vehicle to $1.00,30 as excluding imposition of any other'
fee by a municipality for use of the streets by motor carriers.,, Accordingly this statute is construed in the instant case to prohibit a license
fee on the parking privilege.
Stopping a vehicle to load or unload passengers or freight is generally recognized as a right incident to that of passage.3 2 Many of the
later parking meter ordinances, including the one in question, specifically exempt vehicles thus engaged from the operation of the statute.a8
Even in the absence of such a provision, the courts usually read it in,
either ruling that such stopping is an incident of passage 4 or that a
vehicle being loaded cannot be considered parked-a parked car being
by definition unattended.3 5
The Alabama Supreme Court ruled that a city departed from the
98 N.J. L. 630, 121 Atl. 697 (Sup. Ct. 1923) ; Ex parte Duncan, 179 Okla. 355,
1015 (1937).
65 P.(2d)
28 Southeastern Exp. Co. v. Charlotte, 186 N. C. 668, 120 S. E. 475 (1923);
Ex parte Holt, 740 Okla. 226, 178 Pac. 260 (1919). Accord: Ewing v.Leavenworth, 226 U. S. 464, 33 Sup. Ct. 157, 57 L. ed. 303 (1913); note (1924) 31
A.L.R. 589.
2 179 Okla. 355, 65 P(2d) 1015 (1937).
'0 MOTOR VEmIcrx AcT, c.2, §29, N. C. Pub. Laws 1921; N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie 1935), §2612a. Compare statutory limitation invoked in other parking
meter cases: Shreveport v. Brister, 194 So. 566 (La. 1940) ; Monsour v. Shreveport, 194 La. 569 (La. 1940).
21 State v. Fink, 179 N. C. 712, 120 S. E. 475 (1923)
(invoking N. C. Public
Laws of 1919, c. 189, §5). But ef. Southeastern Exp. Co. v. Charlotte, 186 N. C.
668, 120 S.E. 475 (1923) (holding N. C. Public Laws of 1921, c. 2, §29 constitutional, said act authorizing municipalities to charge a license fee not exceeding
$50 against intra-urban carriers).
-2Pugh v. Des Moines, 176 Iowa 593, 156 N. W. 892 (1916); cf. Lowell v.
Pendleton Auto Co., 123 Ore. 383, 261 Pac. 415 (1927); Wonewoc v. Taubert,
203 Wis. 73, 233 N. W. 755 (1930). Compare Haggenjos v. Chicago, 336 Ill.
573, 168 N. E. 661 (1921) (holding invalid'an ordinance prohibiting all parking
279, 176 N. E. 261
in Chicago's loop district) with Chicago v. McKinley, 344 Ill.
(1931) (upholding a subsequent ordinance prohibiting all stopping but that for
purposes of loading or unloading passengers or freight).
"Section 12 of the Raleigh parking meter ordinance provides: "During actual loading and unloading of delivery vehicles within said parking zones, the
operator of such vehicles shall be exempt from the provisions of this ordinance."
"Ex parte Duncan, 179 Okla. 355, 65 P.(2d) 1015 (1937).
" Gilsey v. Great Neck Plaza, 170 Misc. 945, 11 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 694 (Sup.
Ct, 1939); Clark v. New Castle, 32 D. & C. 371 (Pa. 1938).
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terms of a -dedicatory deed when it charged a fee for parking.36 Parking was discussed as an incident of that "free use of the streets" (as a
right and not a privilege), which had been secured to the public in the
deed. This decision applied the rule that a trustee municipality may
be enjoined against deviating from the terms of a dedicatory deed at
the suit of any injured part. Other cases granting such injunctions
have denied that a municipality was authorized under the deed to erect
telephone poles, install railway lines, or widen the streets to the destruction of the sidewalks.ar But heretofore none has held that a dedicatory deed could place a limitation upon the power of a municipality
to regulate traffic and the use of the streets.
Does the Installation of Parking Meters Constitute an Unreasonable
Interference with the PropertyRights of Abutting Land Owners
So As to Deprive Them of Property without Due Process?
Another basis for the Alabama decision was that rights of the plaintiff as an abutting land owner had been violated by the installation of
parking meters in front of his property.38 The rights of abutting landowners vary in each state,3 9 yet most courts agree that an abutter possesses an absolute right of ingress and egress, whether labeled as
easements or property rights, 40 which cannot be terminated or even
restricted except in case of public necessity. 41 Generally, however, the
municipality is admitted to have authority to determine where and in
42
what manner a property owner shall exercise this right.
The Alabama court states unequivocally that "the right of ingress
and egress is necessarily burdened with the right, within reasonable
limitations, of parking a vehicle or car" and that any fee charged the
abutting owner for the exercise of this right is an obstruction to that
" Birmingham v. Hood-McPherson Realty Co., 233 Ala. 352, 172 So. 114
(1937).
' Brown v. East Point, 149 Ga. 18, 95 S. E. 962 (1918); Collier v. Baker,
160 Tenn. 571, 27 S. E. (2d) 1085 (1930); Road Comm. v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry., 115 W. Va. 647, 177 S. E. 530 (1934) ; note (1935) 41 A. L. R. 1410.
" Birmingham V. Hood-McPherson Realty Co., 238 Ala. 352, 172 So. 114
(1937).
" See Savier v. New York, 206 U. S. 536, 27 Sup. Ct. 686, 57 L. ed. 117
(1906) aff'g 180 N. Y. 27, 72 S. E. 579 (1904).
"' The abutter's right of access is generally considered a property right if he
owns the fee in the street and an easement if the fee is held by the city; State
v. Burkett, 119 Md. 609, 87 Atl. 514 (1913); see In re Ollinger, 160 App. Div.
96, 103, 145 N. Y. Supp. 173, 179 (1st Dep't. 1914).
"Breinig v. Allegheny, 2 A (2d) 842 (Pa. 1938).
"Boston v. Perry, 22 N. E. (2d) 627 (Miss. 1939) (upholding ordinance
prohibiting construction of driveways across certain busy sidewalks) : Fowler v.
Nelson, 213 Mo. App. 82, 246 S. W. 638 (1923) (held that abutter with rear
alley had no absolute right to construct a driveway across busy sidewalk). See
Gilsey Bldgs. v. Great Neck Plaza, 170 Misc. 945, 11 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 604
(Sup. Ct., 1939).

3 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) §1125.
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free access and hence unconstitutional. 43 But by the weight of authority
an abutter has no right or private easement to park in front of his
property different from that incidental privilege of parking he shares
with the public in its easement of travel. 44 And the courts uniformly
hold that once upon the public highway he is subject to all the regulations and limitations imposed on the traveling public in general. 45
When an abutting owner proves that parking meters in front of
his place of business drive away customers, who rather than pay the
parking fee will go elsewhere and deal with his competitors, he may
prove a loss of property which the courts have in many instances protected. 46 Certainly if the abutting owner can present substantial evidence that enforcement of the ordinance constitutes an arbitrary
discrimination against him, the courts will grant him relief. 47 Whether
or not the courts will invalidate a regulation which indirectly discriminates between particular enterprisers because of their location depends
upon the reasonableness of the measure as an exercise of police
power. Zoning ordinances which place similar discriminating restrictions on business and property rights solely on the basis of their location
have been consistently upheld, when found to have a substantial relation
48
to promoting public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
Current reports from municipal governments indicate that parking

"Birmingham v. Hood-McPherson Realty Co., 233 Ala. 352, 172 So. 114
(1937). This conclusion that an abutting owner has an absolute right to park

before his property finds support in decisions granting injunctions against taxi
stands on the street adjoining complainant's property; Eubank v. Yellow Cab Co.,
84 Ind. 144, 149 N. E. 647 (1925) ; Odell v. Bretney, 93 App. Div. 607, 87 N. Y.
Supp. 655 (1st Dep't 1904); and against motorists who consistently park before
complainant's property for an unreasonable length of time; Decker v. Goddard,
233 App. Div. 139, 251 N. Y. Supp. 440 (4th Dep't 1932) rev'g 139 Misc. 824,
249 N. Y. Supp. 381 (Sup. Ct., 1931).
"' Montgomery v. Parker, 21 So. 452, 454 (Ala. 1897); Duluth v. Esterley,
115 Minn. 64, 131 N. W. 791 (1911).
" See Clark v. New Castle, 32 D. & C. 371, 388 (Pa. 1938). Accord: Jones
Beach Boulevard Estate, Inc. v. Moses, 368 N. Y. 362, 197 N. E. 313 (1935)
(denying that an abutting owner had any right to ignore ordinance prohibiting
-left turn, though thereby he was required to go ten miles out of his way to reach
his property). See cases cited supra note 54. But see Birmingham v. HoodMcPherson Realty Co., 233 Ala. 352, 172 So. 114 (1937) (considering stopping
as an incident of abutter's right of access, hence not subject to charge).
"' See Lauf v. Shinner & Co., 82 F.(2d) 68, 72 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936), re'z/d 303
U. S. 323, 58 Sup. Ct. 578, 82 L. ed. 872 (1938). Accord: Callahan v Gilman,
107 N. Y. 360, 14 N. E. 264 (1887) (recognizing special damage to complainant's
business interests by D's use of loading platform across sidewalk nearby, obstructing the
passage of complainant's potential customers).
' T Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L. ed. 220 (1885);
see Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 94, 47 Sup. Ct. 675, 71 L. ed. 1228, 53
A.L.R. 1210 (1927).
"'Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114, 71 L. ed. 303, 54 A. L. R.
1016 (1932) ; Larrabee v. Bell, 56 App. D. C. 121, 10 F.(2d) 986 (1926) ; Appeal
of Parker, 214 N. C. 51, 197 S. E. 706 (1939). 3 WILLOUGHBY, THE CoNsTITUTIoN or THE UNITD STATES (2d ed. 1929) §1190. Cf. note (1924) 32 A. L. R. on
the validity of municipal regulations excluding or limiting automobile traffic in
certain streets.
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meters are proving singularly effective in traffic regulation, diminishing
the difficulty in finding parking spaces, reducing the number of patrolmen necessary to regulate parking, and in some instances, apparently
reducing the number of traffic accidents by as much as thirty-five per
cent. 49 Moreover they seem to be rapidly acquiring public approval.
wherever installed. If these reports are representative, a more lenient
judicial attitude toward parking meters appears warranted. 50 But it is
becoming increasingly apparent that revenue derived from the fivecent-per-hour fee generally imposed far exceeds any reasonable estimate
of the costs of regulating parking,5' and this issue may well be the
determining factor in future parking meter decisions.
V. LAmAR GUDGER.
Deeds-Defective Registration as Breach of Warranty.
A recent North Carolina decision, Dorman v. Goodmnan,' has received considerable attention and has inspired some comment 2 as an
important ruling on an aspect of the recording and registry laws,
namely, the effect of improperly indexing the name of the grantor. Another, and perhaps equally important, holding in the case was disregarded by the comment in the Harvard Law Review, and was almost
ignored by the court itself. Accordingly, the case raises an unusual
question concerning the legal remedies of persons damaged by the
operation of registration statutes.
In 1925, A conveyed a parcel of land to B by warranty deed which
was recorded, but the entry in the "grantors" index was defective by
reason of a wrong initial. In 1925, B conveyed to C by warranty deed
one half of the parcel of land, and in 1930, B conveyed the remaining
half to C by warranty deed. Both of these deeds were properly
recorded andi indexed. In 1932, C conveyed the land to D by warranty
deed properly recorded and indexed. In 1934, judgments against A,
which had been obtained in 1926, were docketed by X. Execution was
issued and the land sold by the sheriff, being bid in by D. D now sued
C for breach of warranty of title. The court held that these judgments,
when docketed, became a lien upon the land in question because of the
improper indexing of the deed from A to B. The court further held
that this encumbrance was in breach of the warranties -contained in the
deed from C to D. Only fourteen words of the opinion were devoted
to this latter holding: ". . . In breach of the covenants and warranties
in the deed from defendants to plaintiff."
American City, July, 1939, p. 53; June, 1940, p. 46; Oct., 1940, p. 13.
'"

American City, Dec., 1939, 9. 63; June, 1940, p. 81; Oct., 1940, p. 99.
"' See note 22, supra.
1213 N. C. 406, 196 S. E. 352 (1938).
2
Note (1938) 52 HARV. L. REv. 170.
5
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In holding that a subsequently docketed judgment created a lien on
the parcel of land, the court was faced with a highly controversial question in interpreting N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1919) §3561,3 but in
allocating the liability arising therefrom upon the defendant in this action, it passed into even more doubtful doctrine, and without much
apparent deliberation. It should be noted that there was no encumbrance upon, nor defect in title to the land at the time the above defendant, C, executed and 'delivered his deed to the above plaintiff, D.
The judgment lien attached, and the execution sale took place tvo years
after that time. A serious question arises, therefore, whether a title to
land or a right in land arising after the covenants in a deed have been
made can be considered a breach of those covenants, and if so, to what
extent and under what circumstances?
It seems to have been nowhere contended that a defect in registration or, indeed, the total absence of any recording of prior de~d are
circumstances within the scope of the covenants contained in an ordinary warranty deed, and there seems little reason to believe that they
are, since a failure to record 'does not of itself create any encumbrance
or impairment of title. Accepting that to be the sound view, we may
discard for the purposes of the present inquiry those covenants operative in praesenti, such as covenants of seisin, good right to convey, and
4
against encumbrances, for these are breached, if at all, when made.
However, covenants such as general warranties of title, covenants to
warrant and defend, and for quiet enjoyment are operative in futuro,
in that they are breached by the successful assertion of a hostile, paramount title, claim, right, or interest in the property at sqme time in
the future.5 The problem is to correctly construe these covenants in the
light of the "probable intention of the parties" or, to be more realistic,
"what those words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of
English, using them in the circumstances in which they were used" ;
and since constant judicial decisions have established these covenants
as formulae expressing a complexity of rights and obligations their
meaning has become more a question of law than of fact and is to be
found in an analysis of those decisions.
Rawle emphatically says that a covenant of warranty extends only
Note (1911) 24 HARV. L. REv. 505.
'Eames v. Armstrong, 142 N. C. 506, 55 S. E. 405 (1906) ; Fishel v. Browning, 145 N. C. 71, 58 S. E. 759 (1907) ; Pridgen v. Long, 177 N. C. 189, 98 S. E.
451 (1919) ; Thompson v. Avery County, 216 N. C. 405, 5 S. E. (2d) 146 (1939) ;
see Wiggins v. Pender, 132 N. C. 628, 636, 44 S. E. 362, 364 (1903) ; Guy v. First
Carolinas Joint Land Bank of Columbia, 202 N. C. 803, 804, 164 S. E. 323, 324
(1932).
'Hodges v. Latham, 98 N. C. 239, 3 S. E. 495 (1887); Mizell v. Ruffin, 118
N. C. 69, 23 S. E. 927 (1896) ; Wilson v. Vreeland, 176 N. C. 504, 97 S. E. 427
(1918); Cover v. McAden, 183 N. C. 641, 112 S. E. 817 (1922).
1HOLIMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1921)
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to "elder and better titles-to those then existing and not to those subsequently acquired."' 7 He quotes from Grenclife v. W -: "All the
judges agreed that when a man bound himself and his heirs to warranty, they are not bound to warrant new titles of action accruing
through the feoffee or any other after the warranty made, but only such
titles as are in esse at the time of the warranty made."'8 As a more
modem authority for his view, he cites Wade v. Comstock9 which has
received the approval of other courts. 10 In that case the Ohio court
found that "from the time of Lord Coke to the present, and with the
exception presently to be noted, they (the authorities) all establish and
confirm the position, that the covenant of general warranty relates
solely to the title as it was at the time the coveyance was mande, and
merely binds the grantor to protect the grantee and his assigns against
a lawful better title, existing before or at the date of the grant."" The
exception to be noted was Curtis v. Deering,'2 which Rawle condemns
as being wrong in principle and contrary to all authority.
The warranty discussed in Grenclife v. W

_-,

3

and by Coke in

4

his commentaries upon Littleton' was an early common law warranty,
and not the covenant of warranty now generally used in American conveyancing. "There is no evidence that the covenant in such general use
in this country, called 'the covenant of warranty', ever had a place in
English conveyancing."' 5 But while some of the remedies available
under the common law warranty are no longer available, that warranty was sometimes treated as a covenant upon which a tenant could
bring a personal action for damages against the warrantor,' 6 and to
7
that extent, at least, is analogous to the modern warranty of title.'
While the conclusion of Dorman v. Goodman seems erroneous under any theory found in the authorities, the broad rule supported by
Rawle cannot be unqualifiedly endorsed. Much would seem to depend
upon the nature and source of the fault which causes the provisions of
the registration statute to operate to bestow the subsequent right or
title to the land. If a grantor convey to one-grantee who fails to record
his deed, and thereafter deliberately conveys to another grantee who
records, the first grantee should be allowed to have an action against
the grantor upon the warranties contained in his deed. But if a grantor
7
RAWLE, COVENANTS FOR TITLE (5th ed. 1887) 168, n. 5.
' I Dyer 42(a), 42(b) (K. B. 1539).
' 11 Ohio 71 (1860).
10 Maeder v. Carondelet, 26 2vMo.
112 (1857); Lukens v. Nicholson, 4 Phil.
R. 22(

1111

).

Ohio 71, 79 (1860)

(italics by the court).

1212 Me. 499 (1835).

1 Dyer 42(a) (K. B. 1539).

15
10
11

142

Co. Lirr. *388(b).

RAWLE, COVENANTS FOR TITLE (5th ed. 1887) 17.

Marston v. Hobbs, 2 Mass. 433 (1807).
Biwer v. Martin, 294 Ill. 488, 128 N. E. 518 (1920).
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conveys to a grantee, who fails to record, and thereafter a judgment is
docketed against the grantor, then the grantor should not be held liable.
Dorman v. Goodman is in essence like this latter hypothetical situation,
for there fault could be imputed to no one except the register of deeds.
In Curtis v. Deering8 the Maine court made the -distinction above
drawn. Land had been conveyed in mortgage, with covenants for seisin
and of warranty, but the mortgagee failed to record the mortgage. The
land was then conveyed in fee by the mortgagor to a purchaser without
notice, who recorded his deed. Under the registry statutes of Maine,
this purchaser thereupon took title free and clear of the mortgage.
Forthwith the mortgagee brought an action against the mortgagor on
the covenant of warranty, and the court allowed recovery. The court
reasoned that a conveyance in fee by the mortgagor in disregard of
the rights of the mortgagee, was a wrongful act. The justification for
this premise need not detain us; the fact that the court deemed such a
premise indispensable to its conclusion is the important thing.
Other courts draw the same distinction,"' and support is also found
in analogous cases holding that a covenant of warranty extends to all
acts of the covenantor himself whether, tortious or otherwise. 20 Tortious
acts of strangers are not embraced within the covenant since the law
provides the grantee another remedy, and it would be unreasonable to
make the grantor an insurer against such acts.21 But where the grantor
himself enters under claim or assertion of right the cases seem uniform
in holding that a breach of the covenant has occurred. 22 Certainly,
then, if a grantor enables a stranger to prevail over the original grantee
by wrongfully issuing a second deed to land already conveyed, he has
23
violated that covenant.
The grantor may be guilty of no wrongful act, yet the grantee may
suffer an impairment of his property rights in four instances, via., by
the omission or negligence of either himself, his immediate grantor,
some prior grantor, or the official charged with the duty of recording
and indexing deeds. In the absence of willful wrong on the part of the
grantor, a grantee who neglects to have his own deed recorded should
,24
bear the consequences. The venerable case of Grenclife v. W19 Scott v. Scott, 70 Pa. 244 (1871).
81 2 Me. 499 (1835).
2" Shrago v. Gulley, 174 N. C. 135, 93 S. E. 458 (1917) ; RAWLE, COVENANTS
FoR TiTnE (5th ed. 1887) 167.
"1Andrus v. St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co., 130 U. S. 643, 9 Sup. Ct. 645,
32 L, ed. 1054 (1889) ; Tierney v. Whiting, 2 Colo. 620 (1875) ; Jerald v. Elly,
51 Iowa 321, 1 N. W. 639 (i879); Wilder v. Ireland, 53 N. C. 85 (1860); Noyes
v. Rockwood, 56 Vt. 647 (1884).
"Avery v. Dougherty, 102 Ind. 443, 2 N. E. 123 (1885) ; RAWLE, COVENAI;TS
FOR TITLE (5th ed. 1887) 167.
" Cincinnati, U. & Ft. W. Ry. v. Pearce, 28 Ind. 502 (1867); Eaton v. Hop-

kins. 71 Fla. 615, 71 So. 922 (1916); Williamson v. Williamson, 71 Me. 442
(1880).
2"1 Dyer 42(a), 42(b) (K. B. 1539).
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sanctions this, for the court there holds that the plaintiff, whose failure
to pay rent to the lord had caused his title to fail, "is the .cause of the
breach of the condition, whereof he shall not himself take advantage, so
as to give himself an action by his own act." The three remaining
possibilities cannot be so neatly disposed of; yet the authorities allowing a grantee to recover for warranty breached by a right arising subsequent to the conveyance require that such right arise as'a result of
an unlawful act by the grantor, and it would be strange to hold that
the mere election of an owner not to record his own deed amounted to
an unlawful act, to say nothing of the situations in which the defect in
registration is the fault of the recording officer, or the omission of some
remote grantor. As the grantor does not warrant the chain of deeds
to the land to be accurately recorded, it appears unreasonable to construe his covenant to include any subsequent judgment docketed against
him or a prior owner, or any unlawful conveyance of a prior owner.
The books of registration are open to both vendor and purchaser. Further, where the gap in registration occurs by the neglect or fault of a
public official, the injured grantee has a remedy against him. In North
Carolina, the register of 'deeds must furnish an official bond to cover
such contingencies. 25
. In Wade v. Comstock, the Ohio court attributes to the covenant of
quiet enjoyment qualities and characteristics not possessed by the covenant to warrant and defend, but does so without discussion or citation
of authority. 26 Several reasons weigh against an extended consideration
of that point here. First, the principal case was concerned with no specific covenant for quiet enjoyment;27 second, it is not customary to
insert such a covenant in deeds used in North Carolina;28 and third,
warranty have long
covenants of quiet enjoyment and covenants of
29
been considered identical in operation and effect.
When the Supreme Court of North Carolina again has occasion to
pass on the instant question, it may well refuse to be bound by the
scanty discussion in Dornan v. Goodman. At any event, we may hope
for an articulation of the theory underlying the rule there applied.
DANIEL K. EDwARDS.

21N. C. CODE ANi . (Michie, 1939) 3555, State ex rel. Kivett v. Young, 106
N. C. 567, 10 S. E. 1019 (1890) ; State ex rel. Daniel v. Grizzard, 117 N. C. 105,
23 S. E. 93 (1895).
" 11 Ohio 71, 83 (1860).
" Information from counsel in the case.

SIMMS AND SmsiMMs, MANUAL OF LAW AND FORMS (9th ed. 1938) 596.
"' Keel v. Ikard, 222 Ala. 617, 133 So. 906 (1931) ; Biwer v. Martin, 294 Ill.
488, 128 N. E. 518 (1920) ; Grist v. Hodges, 14 N. C. 198 (1831) ; Huntley v.
Waddell, 34 N. C. 32 (1851); Fishel v. Browning, 145 N. C. 71, 58 S. E. 759
28

(1907).
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Dower-Widow's Claim in Insolvent Estate After Foreclosure
of Mortgage in Which She Joined.
Plaintiff's husband died seized of land encumbered with mortgages
in which P had joined. These mortgages were foreclosed, realizing no
surplus. The estate being insolvent, D, Administratrix, sold other unencumbered land to make assets. P then filed a claim equivalent to her
dower in the foreclosed parcels, contending that such claim took preference over the unsecured creditors and was entitled to prior payment
out of the estate assets. Held, the widow's position was that of a surety
whose property had been sold to pay the debt of her principal, and she
was thus subrogated to the unsecured position of the mortgagee in
these assets.'
At common law a widow received no dower from her husband's
equitable estate. When she joined in his mortgage she released any
right to dower in the property itself, and since her husband retained
only an equity of redemption no further dower right could attach.2
Today, the widow's right to dower in her husband's equitable estate is
generally recognized; hence, joinder in his mortgage is not a final relinquishing of dower. However several views are taken as to the
amount of dower the widow may receive from such mortgaged property. (1) A majority3 restrict her dower to one-third of the surplus
derived from foreclosure, on the theory she has released her contingent
right of dower in the whole of the land and takes only from the remaining equitable estate. (2) Other states 4 compute her dower as onethird of the entire sale price payable out of the surplus, but do not
discuss the problem arising where there is insufficient surplus. Their
rationale is that the wife signs away her dower only as further security
for her husband's debt; and that she still has against all but the mortgagee a prior lien on the property to the amount of her dower. Tennessee 5 has allowed the wife one-third of the surplus and then onethird of an amount which the mortgagee could have recovered as his
'Brown v. McLean, 217 N. C. 553, 8 S. E. (2d) 807 (1940).
'Steele v. Carroll, 12 Pet. 201 (U. S. 1838) ; Needermeyer, Inc. v. Fehl, 153
Ore. 656, 57 P. (2d) 1086 (1936).
'In Re Gish, 32 F. (2d) 322 (W. D. Ky. 1928) (statute); Trawbridge v.
Sypher, 55 Iowa 353, 7 N. W. 567 (1880); McClain v. McClain, 151 Ky, 356,
151 S. W. 926 (1912) (statute); Bank of Commerce v. Owens, 31 Md. 320
(1869) ; Burrall v. Berder, 61 Mich. 608, 28 N. W. 731 (1866) ; Hawley v. Bradford, 9 Paige 200 (N. Y. 1841); Hoy v. Varner, 100 Va. 600, 42 S. E. 690
(1902) ; Poteet v. International Harvester Co., 153 Va. 304, 149 S. E. 512 (1929).
' Oades v. Standard Savings & Loan Ass'n., 257 Mich. 469, 241 N. W. 262
(1932) ; Turner v. Washington Realty Co., 130 S. C. 501, 126 S. E. 137 (1925);
Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. State Tax Commissioner; 90 Utah 415, 62
P. (2d) 270 (1936); Commercial Banking and Trust Co. v. Dudley, 76 W. Va.
322, 86 S. E. 307 (1915) : Re Lesperance, 61 Ont. L. R. 94, 4 D. L. R. 391 (1927).
'Yoe v. Sanson, 48 S. W. 317 (Tenn. 1898); Flynn v. Flynn, 1 Tenn. App.
188 (1925).
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pro-rata share had he first gone into the personalty, which was primarily liable. (3) North Carolina6 and Ohio7 pursue a quasi-suretyship theory and allow the widow one-third of the whole to be taken
from the surplus, or if there is no surplus she becomes ipso facto a
creditor of her husband's estate. In adopting the "suretyship" analogy,
'8
the two courts admit that "properly speaking she is not a surety,"
yet decide that "as between each other he (the husband) would be the
principal and she the surety."9 Since this doctrine is one of convenience,10 it appears likely that the wife would not be held to assume
the full status of a surety, with its attendant rights and obligations.
Conceding that the wife retains a dower claim, what is its relation
to other claims against the estate? Where the estate is solvent, it is
generally held that as against the heirs the wife is entitled to full
exoneration from the personalty,"- although New York 12 allows no reimbursement beyond the foreclosure surplus.
Where the estate is insolvent the problem is more intricate. Since
any surplus remaining after foreclosure is deemed to be realty, the
widow has a prior lien to the extent of her allotted dower.13 Under the
North Carolina "suretyship" view there is a similar result where a
surplus exists,, yet if it appears that there will be insufficient surplus
14
the widow may adopt either of two procedures: (1) She is entitled
to have the mortgage satisfied by first selling the two-thirds of the land
not embraced by dlower and the reversion in the other third, then having any residue 5 of 'the debt paid ratably out of the administration
' Creecy v. Pearce, 69 N. C. 67 (1837) ; Gwathmey v. Pearce, 74 N. C. 398
(1876); Gore v. Townsend, 105 N. C. 288, 11 S. E. 160 (1890); VirginiaCarolina Chemical Co. v. Walston, 187 N. C. 817, 123 S. E. 196 (1924); Barnes
v. Crawford 201 N. C. 434, 160 S.E. 464 (1931) ; Parsons v. Leak, 204 N. C.
92, 167 S. E. 567 (1933) ; Realty Purchase Corp. v. Hall, 216 N. C. 237, 4 S.E.
(2d) 514 (1939); See Trust Co. v. Benbow, 135 N. C. 303, 312, 47 S. E. 435,
438 (1904).
Mandel v. Mcaave, 46 Ohio St. 407, 22 N. E. 290 (1889).
8 Gore v. Townsend, 105 N. C. 228, 230, 11 S. E. 160, 161 (1890).
'Mandel v. McClare, 46 Ohio St. 407, 414, 22 N. E. 290, 292 (1889).
"0Could not these courts adopting the second view, by applying the principle
of subrogation, obtain a result similar to that of the suretyship state. They
already apply a rule under which the husband's interest is completely exhausted
before that of the widow's. See Commercial Banking & Trust Co. v. Dudley,
76 W. Va. 332, 342, 86 S.E. 307, 311 (1915) ("A suggested relationship of suretyship between the husband and wife is not at all essential to the conclusion,"
in that since the wife signs the mortgage only for the benefit of the mortgagee
she has relinquished nothing against the heirs and unsecured creditors.)
" Whitehead v. Bautwell, 218 Ala. 109, 117 So. 623 (1928); Gore v. Townsend, 105 N. C. 228 (1890) ; Mowry v. Mowry, 24 R. I. 565, 54 Atl. 383 (1902).
2 House v. House, 10 Paige 158 (N. Y. 1843) ; Mosely v. Marshall, 22 N. Y.
200 (1889).
13 See Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Walston, 187 N. C. 817, 824, 123
S. E. 196, 200 (1924).
" Caroon v. Cooper, 63 N. C. 386 (1869); Overton v. Hinton, 123 N. C. 1
(1898).
1" Creecy v. Pearce. 69 N. C. 67, 70 (1873)
("We adopt the analogy in bank-

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

of the estate. Then if any part of the mortgage debt remains unsatisfied it will be a charge on the dower land. 16 Or (2) she may allow the
sale of the property as a whole and become a creditor of her husband's
estate for the amount of her dower sold and not satisfied out of the
surplus.17 The principal case holds that since the widow suffered the
sale without demanding protection of her dower, she becomes only an
unsecured creditor of the estate. This seems to intimate that had she
insisted upon the first procedure, she would have been a priority creditor of the estate (probably on the ground that her dower status had
not been abandoned). In no North Carolina case has a dower claim
been given priority in the personalty of an insolvent estate. Gwathmey
v. Pearce's is absolutely contrary to such a distinction. In that case the
supreme court in a previous appeal 9 had ordered sale of the property
under the first method outlined, and after a necessary sale of the dower
interest the widow was deemed by the lower court an unsecured creditor entitled to share pro-rata in the estate. The supreme court found
no error.
Certain dicta in Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Walston20 was
relied upon by the plaintiff to establish her priority as a creditor. Concerning the rights of a widow in the personalty of an insolvent estate,
it 'was there said "that the widow's 'dower is superior to the rights of
unsecured creditors . . . and the widow is entitled to dower as against
unsecured creditors, devisees and legatees." In support thereof were
cited Creecy v. Pearce2 1 and Campbell v. Murphy,22 but in those cases
the court expressly dismissed such rule as inapplicable where there is a
mortgage. Often the rule of "priority in the surplus" is loosely stated
and may easily mislead a reader into the erroneous belief that the court
is stating a rule of the widow's position as to the personalty.
No authority supports a priority view under either of the two procedures, and it is difficult to conceive "on what principle it is that a
debt which because a charge on the land, is also to have priority in
respect to the personal estate." 23 Had the mortgagee suffered a deficiency his status against the estate would have been that of an unrupt cases where a creditor having collateral security is only allowed to prove
the balance after exhausting the collateral security.")
18 Creecy v. Pearce, 69 N. C. 67
(1873) ; see Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co.
v. Walston, 187 N. C. 817, 823, 123 S. E. 196, 199 (1924).
17 Of necessity, under the suretyship theory she is to become a creditor, for
she is a surety whose property has been sold to pay the debt of the principal.
American Blower Co. v. MacKenzie, 197 N. C. 152, 147 S. E. 829 (1929); see
Trust Co. v. Benbow, 135 N. C. 303, 312, 47 S. E. 435, 438 (1904).
1874 N. C. 398 (1876).

Is Creecy v. Pearce, 69 N. C. 67 (1873).
20 187 N. C. 817, 824, 123 S. E. 196, 200 (1924).
2169 N. C. 97 (1873).
2255 N. C. 357 (1836).
" See Creecy v. Pearce, 69 N. C. 67, 69 (1873).
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secured creditor, and it appears pdradoxical to subrogate the widow
to a more favored position. To hold it a priority claim is to make the
unsecured creditors insurers of the wife to the value of a property interest which she has validly contracted away.
There appears no persuasive logic in allowing the claim under the
first procedure and not under the second. The inconsistency of such a
distinction is clearly illustrated by a hypothetical application of the two
methods to an insolvent estate with a piece of property mortgaged for
$1,000.00. (1) Under the first procedure assume that the mortgagee
sells for $500.00 the two-thirds and remainder in the one-third of the
dower property, leaving $500.00 to share ratably in the personalty. Assuming also that the estate is paying 40% on claims, thus paying mortgagee $200.00 and leaving a deficiency of $300.00 to be taken from the
dower. The sale of the dower brings exactly $300.00. Thus the creditor is paid entirely and the widow becomes a creditor of the estate for
$300.00, and if the intimation of the instant case governs, she will be
a priority creditor. Under this view the corpus of the estate suffers two.
invasions to the extent of $500.00. (2) Under the second procedure,
where the whole property is sold: Assuming that the sale brings.
$800.00, the mortgagee becomes a creditor of the estate for $200.00 and
the wife for $300.00 (the value of her dower interest), each receiving
40%, for the principal case intimates that under this procedure the
wife is not a priority creditor. Thus the estate pays the creditor $80.0a
and the wife $120.00 or a total of $200.00. Even if the widow were
held a priority creditor, receiving $300.00, the maximum paid by the
estate would be slightly under $380.00, considerably less than the$500.00 paid under the first procedure. Therefore, there would seem to.
be more reason for allowing the widow's priority under the second procedure than under the first, because even with the same priority theestate would pay less. It would also bring increment to the estate in
that a single sale of the whole property would ordinarily bring a higher
price than selling parts separately. Although the mortgagee receives at
least $120.00 less under the second procedure, he is a party to his own
injury since he failed to adopt the first method.
It is difficult to see why the court should not favor the second procedure and allow the wife no superior priority as a result of following
the first,24 for only under the second can the "Bankruptcy Rule" and
"Suretyship Rule" function together smoothly. In contrast, under the
first method inequity and uncertainty will of necessity arise, it being
necessary to pro-rate the claims once without the widow's claim included, since only after the pro-rata share of the mortgagee is determined can the amount taken from dower be known, thereby determin" See note 22, supra.
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ing the claim of the widow. Then the subsequent addition of the widow's claim will have one of two inequitable results: (1) If all the liabilities computed in the pro-rata are paid at once, the estate will be
exhausted, having nothing for the subsequent claim of the widow, or
(2) if only the mortgagee be paid and the widow's claim then thrown
in with the other unpaid creditors, it will reduce their pro-rata share,
thereby making the mortgagee's claim preferred to those of other creditors of equal rank. Under the first procedure it is impossible to avoid
this problem, because if the mortgagee draws on the personalty, dower
cannot remain untouched, for the insolvent estate pays only a ratable
share, thus leaving a residue of debt which will ultimately bring in the
widow as creditor. However, if the seconf method be used, all the
claims are definite and simultaneously computable, thus facilitating the
administration of estates and correcting the inequities arising from two
computations.
Accordingly, it is recommended that North Carolina follow its
precedents in allowing priority only in a surplus existing after satisfaction of the mortgage debt, and that the intimation of the principal case
receive no embodiment in our law.

J.

KENYON WILSON, JR.

Injunctions-Courts-Injunction Against Threatened
Violation of Agreement Not to Sue.
Plaintiffs petitioned Polk County Superior Court to enjoin the husband of one of them from instituting against the other plaintiff a
civil action in Forsyth County Superior Court for alienation of plaintiff
wife's affections. It was alleged that defendant husband had signed
separation papers accompanied by an agreement to refrain from bringing such a suit, that the threatened suit would violate said agreement,
and would do irreparable injury to plaintiff wife's character. The trial
judge granted a temporary injunction until the final hearing, and defendant appealed. Held, affirmed.'
The problem of enjoining litigation brought or threatened in violation of an agreement not to sue may involve litigation in the courts of
another state, 2 in a local inferior court,3 or in a court of concurrent
jurisdiction with that in which the injunction is sought or in another
branch of the same court. This note deals with the latter situation.
Some states by statute 4 or by judicial decision,r purport to deprive
' Boone v. Boone, 217 N. C. 722, 9 S. E. (2d) 383 (1940).
2 Note (1935) 13 N. C. L. REV. 235.
' Bomneisler v. Forster, 154 N. Y. 229, 48 N. E. 534 (1897).
4Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66; 17 HALSOURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND
(1911) 261.
State v. Rightor, 39 La. Ann. 619, 2 So. 385 (1887) ; Schumert-Waifield-Buja,
Inc. v. Buie, 148 La. 726, 87 So. 726 (1921); Kuhn v. Beard, 151 La. 546, 92
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the courts of power to entertain an independent action for injunction.
Particularly is this so when the litigation is pending in a court which
has taken jurisdiction 6 and which can afford adequate relief by equitable
defense. 7 Other states, however, concede that power exists8 to enjoin
9
the litigation in an independent action but hold that it is error to
exercise it save in the exceptional case where an equitable defense or
counterclaim in the same action will not sufficiently help. 10 Both lines
of cases are motivated by a desire to conserve the economy of judicial
administration" in a concurrent or single judicial system. The distinction between a void injunction and an erroneous one is vital in con12
tempt proceedings.
So. 52 (1922) ; Grant v. Quick, 5 Sandf. 612 (N. Y. 1852) ; Bennet v. Le Roy,
14 How. Pr. 178 (N. Y 1857) ; Winfield v. Bacon, 24 Barb. 154 (N. Y. 1857) ;
Nielson v. Schiller, 92 Utah 137, 66 P. (2d) 365 (1937). But see note 10, injra.
6 State v. District Court, Fourth Judicial Dist., 195 Minn. 169, 262 N. W.
155 (1935); Mo. R.v. STAT. (1919) §1951, Wabash Ry. v. Sweet, 103 Mo. App.
267, 77 S. W. 123 (1903); Childs v. Martin, 69 N. C. 126 (1873); Young v.
Rollins, 85 N. C. 485 (1881).
"Anthony v. Dunlap, 8 Cal. 27. (1857) ; Wilson v. Baker, 64 Cal. 475, 2 Pac.
253 (1884); S. C. CODE (1932) §6004, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yance,
181 8 S. C. 369, 187 S. E. 536 (1936).
Engels v. Lubeck, 4 Cal. 31 (1854); Meredith v. Crowder, 81 Ind. App.
221, 142 N. E. 876 (1924); Williams v. Payne, 150 Kan. 462, 94 P. (2d) 341
(1939); Davison v. Hough, 165 Mo. 561, 65 S. W. 731 (1901); Capitain v.
Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 240 Mo. 484, 144 S. W. 466 (1912); State ex
rel. Terry v. Allen, 308 Mo. 230, 271 S. W. 469 (1925) ; Erie Ry. v. Ramsey, 45
N. Y. 637 (1871) ; Van Sinderen v. Lawerence, 50 Hon. 272, 3: N. Y. Supp. 25
(1888); Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Stalla, 166 App. Div. 639, 152 N. Y. Supp.
183 (1st Dep't 1915).
0 Bickett v. Johnson, 8 Cal. 34 (1857); Wilson v. Baker, 64 Cal. 475, 2 Pac.
253 (1884) ; Galey v. Board of Com'rs., 174 Ind. 181, 91 N. E. 593 (1910) ; State
v. District Court, Fourth Judicial Dist., 195 Minn. 169, 262 N. W. 155 (1935) ;
Wabash Ry. v. Sweet, 103 Mo. App. 267, 77 S. W. 123 (1903) ; Burke v. Burke,
212 N. Y. 303, 160 N. E. 62 (1914) ; Rosenberg v. Mount Carmel Cemetery Ass'n.,
244 N. Y. 573, 155 N. E. 902 (1927); McReynolds v. Harshaw, 37 N. C. 195
(1842) ; Childs v. Martin, 69 N. C. 126 (1873) ; Young v. Rollins, 85 N. C. 485
(1881); Davis v. Federal Land Batik, 217 N. C. 145, 7 S. E. (2d) 373 (1940);
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yance, 181 S. C. 369, 187 S. E. 536 (1936).
Cf note 5, supra.
10 Erie Ry. Co. v. Ramsey, 45 N. Y. 637 (1871).
1 Conversely, for this same reason, the court first taking jurisdiction sometimes finds it necessary to enjoin other litigation respecting the same subject
matter. Davison v. Hough, 165 Mo. 561, 65 S. W. 731 (1901); Capitain v.
Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 240 Mo. 484, 144 S. W. 466 (1912) ; State ex rel.
Terry v. Allen, 308 Mo. 230, 271 S. W. 469 (1925); Van Sinderen v. Lawerence,
50 Hun. 272, 3 N. Y. Supp. 25 (1888); Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Stalla, 166
App. Div. 639, 152 N. Y. Supp. 183 (1st Dep't 1915) ; See Wabash Ry. v. Sweet,
103 Mo. App. 276, 280, 77 S. W. 123, 124 (1903); Erie Ry. v. Ramsey, 45 N.
Y. 637, 647 (1871).
'2Pitcock v. State, 91 Ark. 527, 121 S. W. 742 (1909); People v. Barrett,
203 Ill. 99, 67 N. E. 742 (1903); State v. Meyer, 86 Kan. 793, 122 Pac. 101
(1912); Saginaw Lumber & Salt Co. v. Griffore, 145 Mich. 287, 108 N. W.
681 (1906) ; McHenry v. State, 91 Miss. 562, 44 So. 831 (1907) ; St. Louis, K.
& S. Ry. v. Wear, 135 Mo. 230, 36 S. W. 357 (1896); it re Knaup, 144 Mo.
653, 46 S. W. 151 (1898); Cauffman v. Van Buren, 136 N. Y. 253, 32 N. E.
775 (1892); Savage v. Sternberg, 19 Wash. 679, 54 Pac. 611 (1898); Cline v.
Whitaker, 144 Wis. 439, 129 N. W. 400 (1911).
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Where, however, the litigation prohibited by the agreement not to
sue has not been instituted but is merely threatened, other considerations, of a quia tinet nature, become important. Even if an equitable
defense might suffice had the suit been brought, it may be that an independent injunction is justified where the very threat of litigation works
irreparable harm. For example, such a threat might operate as a
cloud on title and frighten away the prospective purchasers of land.1 8
If, on the other hand, it is the actual institution of the suit itself which
is feared, specific performance of the agreement not to sue, effectuated
through an equitable defense1 4 to the main suit once it has been brought,
would appear to be the appropriate remedy' 5 in most cases.
The situation in the principal case does not appear to have warranted independent injunction. Rather, it might better have been left
to be dealt with by an equitable defense, based upon the agreement not
to sue, to the action for alienation of affections when brought. Such a
disposition of the matter would have been more in harmony with the
relations necessary between two coordinate branches of the North Carolina Superior Court and with the policy of effectuating, as far as possible, complete relief in the same action. Any notion that the plaintiff
wife needed an independent injunction to protect her reputation against
the allegations and proofs in the threatened action for alienation of
affections is strangely at variance with her own disclosures of misconduct in the injunction suit.
The court relied upon a North Carolina case' 0 of injunction against
7
litigation in the courts of another state and a New York case' of
injunction against litigation pending in a local inferior court. Neither
situation parallels that of the principal case. In the first, the North
Carolina case, the foreign court was not in a reciprocal position. In
the second, the Bomeisler case, the litigation enjoined was pending in
the superior court of the city of New York and not in another branch
of the state-wide supreme court. The opinion does not deal with the
fact that as between such branches independent injunctions against
litigation, once regarded as nullities,' 8 are now held, unless indispen21 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1743, Power Co. v. Power Co., 175
N. C. 668, 96 S. E. 99 (1918).
I'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §519, Russell v. Adderton, 64 N. C.
417 (1870); Harshaw v. Woofin, 64 N. C. 568 (1870); Evans v. Roper, 74
N. C. 639 (1876); Craven v. Freeman, 82 N. C. 361 (1880); MCINToSH, N. C.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1929) §461(6).
1
MCINTosH, N. C. PRACTIcE AND PROCEDURE (1929) §862, n. 87; Burke v.

Burke, 212 N. Y. 303, 106 N. E. 62 (1914).
" Wierse v. Thomas, 145 N. C. 261, 59 S. E. 58 (1907). See note 2, supra.
17 Bomeisler v. Forster, 154 N. Y. 229, 48 N. E. 534 (1897).
" Grant v. Quick, 5 Sandf. 612 (N. Y. 1852) ; Bennet v. Le Roy, 14 How. Pr.
178 (N. Y. 1857); Winfield v. Bacon, 24 Barb. 154 (N. Y. 1857).
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sable, to be erroneous and reversible upon appeal. 19 Moreover, two
suits had begun following two successive settlements, and the court
felt that a mere defense to the pending action would not effectively
prevent the repetition of this persistent persecution. Finally, the New
York court has since reversed an injunction against an action pending, in violation of a settlement, in another branch of the supreme court;
compelled resort to a defense in that action, even though the complaint
therein attacked the character of the plaintiff -in the injunction suit;
and restricted the Bomeisler case to its special facts. 20
It is submitted that the principal case unnecessarily complicates the
North Carolina procedure.
PHILIP E. LuCAS.
Receiverships-Priority of Operating Expenses Over
Secured Creditors in the Corpus.
At the instance of parties other than the secured creditors a lumber
corporation was put in the hands of a receiver with authority to con*tinue the business. The court ordered the receiver to sell certain
lumber, which was the sole asset of the company, and which had been
pledged to appellants (secured creditors). The court further ordered
the receiver to retain twenty percent of the money realized from the sale
to pay the expenses of the receivership and to remit the balance to the
secured creditors. Held, order affirmed. Where a receivership enures
to the benefit of a lienholder, his lien is subordinate to the administrative expenses.'
In Fosdick v. Schal, 2 the United States Supreme Court adopted the
rule that in railroad receiverships the operating expenses have a priority
in payment out of the current income over the mortgagees of the corpus,
and a payment to the mortgagees out of the current income is a diversion which gives the operating expenses a priority on the corpus equal
in amount to the diversion. The court declared that railroads were
affected with such vital public interest that they were obligated to continue operation. This rule has been unanimously followed as to railroads,3 and later cases have added that if the current income be in"oErie Ry. Co. v. Ramsey, 45 N. Y, 637 (1871) ; Burke v. Burke, 212 N. Y.
303,20106 N. E. 62 (1914).
Burke v. Burke, 212 N. Y. 303, 106 N. E. 62 (1914).
'Wood v. Woodbury & Pace, Inc., 217 N. C. 356, 8 S. E. (2d) 240 (1940).
299 U. S.235, 25 L. ed. 339 (1878).
'Burnham v. Bowen, 111 U. S. 776, 4 Sup. Ct. 675, 28 L. ed. 596 (1884);
Calhoun v. St. Louis & S. E. Ry., 14 Fed. 9 (C. C. D. Ind. 1880); Clark v.
Central R. R. & Banking Co., 66 Fed. 803 (C. C. A. 5th, 1895); Central Bk.
& Tr. Co. v. Greenville & Western R. R., 248 Fed. 350 (W. D. S. C. 1918);
Central Tr. Co. of N. Y. v. Pittsburg S. & N. R. R., 223 N. Y. 347, 119
N. E. 565 (1918) ; MclIlhemey v. Bing, 80 Tex. 4, 13 S. W. 655 (1890); Bellingham Bay Improv. Co. v. Fairhaven & N. W. Ry., 17 Wash. 371, 49 Pac. 514
(1897).
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sufficient to meet the expenses of operation under the receivership, then
they shall be a prior lien on the property itself. 4 However, it has been
pointed out that this latter doctrine is based on an extraordinary equitable power and is to be limited to cases where the public is interested
in the continued operation of the business. 5 The majority of courts
have extended this doctrine to other public utilities0 such as telegraph
companies, 7 canal companies,8 and power and water companies.0 At
this point there is a split of authority because other courts have held
the doctrine inapplicable in cases other than those involving railroads.10
Since the rule has been. held not to embrace other public utilities or
quasi-public utilities, some courts have refused to apply it in cases involving gas companies" and electric power companies.12
When attempts were made to include strictly private corporations
within the rule, the majority of courts deemed themselves without the
power to do so.' 3 A New Jersey court' 4 went so far as to say, "The
general power to authorize the issue of receiver's certificates of indebtedness for the purpose of continuing a business which exists in the
case of a public corporation does not exist in the case of a private
corporation. When a receiver is appointed of a private corporation, the
court may authorize him to continue the business temporarily, but with
the purpose of winding up, provided that the receiver has in his possession sufficient assets to enable him to go on; but if he should find it
necessary to borrow money with which to continue the business, the
'Meyer Rubber Co. v. Georgetown & W. R. R., 174 Fed. 731 (C. C. E. D,
S. C. 1909); Central Tr. Co. v. Thurman, 94 Ga. 735, 20 S. E. 141 (1894);

Standard Steel Works Co. v. Williams, 155 Ga. 177, 116 S. E. 636 (1923);
Craver v. Greer, 107 Tex. 356, 179 S.W. 862 (1916).
'Craver v. Greer, 107 Tex. 356, 179 S. W. 862 (1916).

81
T

CLARK, REcEiavRs (2d ed. 1929) §470 (a).

Keelyn v. Carolina Mutual Tel. & Tel. Co., 90 Fed. 29 (C. C. D. S. C.

1898).
' Hewitt v. Great Western Beet Sugar Co., 20 Idaho 235, 118 Pac. 296
(1911).
'Citizens

Tr. Co. v. Nat'l Equipment & Supply Co., 178 Ind. 167, 98 N. E.

865 (1912).
Farmers Loan & Tr. Co. v. Burbank Power & Water Co., 196 Fed. 539
"o

(E. D. Wash. 1912); Belknap Savings Bank v. Lamar Land & Canal Co., 28

Colo. 326, 64 Pac. 12 (1901); Central Tr. & Savings Bank v. Chester County
Electric Co., 9 Del. Ch. 247, 80 Ati. 801 (1911) ; Wiggins v. Neversink Light &
Power Co., 47 Misc. 315, 93 N. Y. Supp. 853 (Sup. Ct., 1905); McDermott v.
(1918).
230, 95 S.E. 841Va.
Pentrass Gas Co., 82 W. Va. Gas
230, 95 S.E. 841 (1918).
Co., 82 W.
McDermott v. Pentrass
Farmers Loan & Tr. Co. v. Burbank Power & Water Co., 196 Fed. 539
(E. D. Wash. 1912).
" Hanna v. State Tr. Co., 70 Fed. 2 (C. C. A. 8th, 1895); Smith v. Shenandoah Valley Nat'l Bank, 246 Fed. 379 (C. C. A. 4th, 1917); Standley v. Hendrie
& Bolthoff Mfg. Co., 27 Colo. 331, 61 Pac. 600 (1900); Oldroyd v. McCrea,
65 Utah 142, 235 Pac. 580 (1925); 1 CLAR,- REcEIVERSHIPS (2d ed. 1929)

§4704 (b).

" Lockport Felt Co. v. United Box Board & Paper Co., 76 N. J. Eq. 686,

70 At. 980 (Ch., 1908).

1940]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

rule undoubtedly is that he should not be authorized to issue receiver's
certificates to raise money therefor, which shall displace the lien 6f a
subsisting encumbrance. The reason for this is very obvious. It
would be a violation of that clause of the Federal Constitution which
prohibits the states from passing laws violative of the obligations of
contract."' 5 Other courts do not deem themselves without the power
to order the business continued in cases of private corporations, but
are reluctant to act. 16 This is due to a feeling ". . . that the issuance
of receiver's certificates in the case of private enterprise is not a sound
exercise of judgment, rather than to any conclusion that they lack the
power to issue certificates in such cases. Indeed the failure to distinguish between the power to issue and the propriety of issuing receiver's certificates has led to some confusion. Fundamentally the courts
have as much right to issue receiver's certificates in the case of a strictly
private enterprise as in the case of a quasi-public one."'1 But regardless of theory, most courts refuse to allow the receiver of a private
corporation to issue certificates with a prior lien on the corpus ahead
of the mortgagees.' s
The Supreme Court of the United States has not yet declared the
doctrine inapplicable as to private corporations, but lower federal courts
uniformly hold with the majority. 19 It is a fear of abridging the
mortgage contract and of taking the mortgagee's property right, his
security, that causes these courts to proceed with the greatest caution
in cases involving quasi-public utilities and to reject the doctrine where
private corporations are involved.
North Carolina, in an early case, followed the rule of the majority, 20 refusing to apply the doctrine to private corporations. In
that case a receiver was appointed for a lumber corporation, with
authority to take charge of all the corporate property. The receiver,
pursuant to this authority, attempted to take possession of lumber in
the hands of a creditor who held subject to a mechanic's lien. The court,
upholding the creditor, said: "His lien, if he has one, appears to have
attached to the lumber before the appointment of the receiver, and he
has the clear right under sectiorn 1783 of The Code to the full amount
of any lien he may be entitled to, free from any possible or probable
charges which might be fixed upon it, if it went into the hands of a
receiver, for costs and expenses of the suit including the receiver's
Atl. at
at Holmes
690, 70 Mfg.
Id.
Co.,981.19 F. (2d) 239 (D. Conn. 1927) ; Glenn v. Martin,
In re

1

208 Ala. 247, 94 So. 351 (1922) ; Cox v. Snow, 47 Idaho 229, 273 Pac. 933 (1929).
" Cox v. Snow, 47 Idaho 229, 234, 273 Pac. 933, 935 (1929).
't See notes 13 and 16, supra.
10

Note (1926) 40 A. L. R. 244, 247.

Huntsman Bros. & Co. v. Linville River Co., 122 N. C. 583, 29 S. E. 838
(1898).
'
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charges." 2 1 This rule was later recognized in a strong dictum: "the
doctrine of Fosdick v. Schall seems to be restricted to railroads and
similar, or quasi, corporations. The weight of authority is that the
rule applicable to railroad cases in regard to the displacement of the
lien of the mortgage does not extend to private corporations ...
'Where the parties are all before the court, and do not object, and where
it is necessary to put the property in a marketable shape, it seems that
the court may authorize the payment of claims in preference to mortgage liens. But the weight of authority holds that it is not the province
of a court of equity to undertake the management of a private business,
and to create liens thereon without the consent of the mortgagee, and
that it cannot displace the lien of the mortgage where the mortgagee
asserts an independent title under his instrument of mortgage giving him
the right of possession'." 22 One year after this decision, North Carolina ignored this rule. In Armour & Company v. Peoples Laundry
Co., 23 where a receiver was appointed on a creditor's bill to wind up an
insolvent laundry corporation, the court authorized the receiver to
carry on the business by the issuance of certificates which were given a
priority in the corpus ahead of the mortgagee. This was done despite
the fact that the mortgagee did not consent to the proceeding. The
court cited no authority; neither did it attempt to limit the power
to allow receivership expenses a priority in the corpus ahead of the
mortgagee in other or similar situations. North Carolina had enacted
a statute fifteen years before, which was not mentioned in the decision.
The statute provides: "Before distribution of the assets of an insolvent
corporation among the creditors or stockholders, the court shall allow
a reasonable compensation to the receiver for his services, not to
exceed five percent upon receipts and disbursements, and the cost and
expenses of administration of his trust and of the proceeding in said
court, to be first paid out of said assets." 24 The court in the foregoing
case may have adhered to the statute as a basis for its decision.
However, the statute fails to explain the Armour case, since it was
also in force at the time of the earlier dictum which pronouncea a
contrary view. What, then, is the basis for the Armour case? A
privately owned laundry is obviously not a public utility affected with
21
Id. at 586, 29 S. E. at 839. Code section today is N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1939) §2435, which provides, as it did then, for the securing of mechanic's liens.
"See Roberts v. Bowen Mfg. Co., 169 N. C. 27, 32, 85 S. E. 45, 48 (1915).
2-8
171 N. C. 681, 89 S. E. 19 (1916). The case of Cox v. Snow, 47 Idaho
229, 273 Pac. 993 (1929), cites this North Carolina case with others to demon-

strate the right of a court to authorize receiver's certificates where the purpose is
other than the preservation of the property, but provided no vested interests arc
disturbed.
2 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1215.
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a public interest. The court does not say that the issuance of the
receiver's certificates was essential to the preservation of the property
pending liquidation. It merely says that protection of the fund demanded that the property be placed in the hands of a receiver and so
managed as to produce the best results for the creditors. The court
in this case seems to have limited its concern to the unsecured creditors,
to the unreasonable detriment of the secured creditors who had loaned
money to the corporation in reliance on the supposed security which a
mortgage gives.
A later case, concerning a private corporation, involved the relative
priority of claims growing out of a receivership obtained by a simple
contract creditor without objection. 25 The following order of priorities
was observed: the mortgages existing on the property at the time of
purchase and the purchase money mortgages, the court costs and expenses of receivership, claims for labor incurred prior to the receivership, tort claims accruing prior to the receivership, and finally, the claim
of the mortgagees under mortgages executed by the corporation prior
to the receivership. The purchase money mortgage gained its priority
on the theory that whenever property is acquired by a purchase money
mortgage the vendee never has the legal title but only the equity of
redemption. The expenses of the receivership achieved priority under
C. S. 1215, previously referred to. The claims for tort and labor took
priority by virtue of a statute,26 in existence at the time, which provided
that mortgages of corporate property did not take priority over executions on tort or labor judgments against the corporation. The ordinary
mortgages of the corporation are placed last on the list of priorities on
the theory that one who takes a mortgage on corporation property does
so with the knowledge of these statutes. It is to be noted that the court
applied C. S. 1215 as applying to expenses incurred by operation of the
business in receivership.
The majority of courts have recognized two exceptions to the rule
that the doctrine is inapplicable to private corporations. Expenses may
be placed ahead of secured creditors: first where the expenses were
necessary to preserve the property from deterioration pending the liquidation 27 and, second, where the secured creditors consent.2 8 As above
shown, North Carolina at times has failed to recognize the rule at all.
Assuming that it recognizes the rule, it apparently, by the principal case
" Humphrey Bros. v. Buell-Crocker Lumber Co., 174 N. C. 514, 93 S. E.

971 (1917).

" N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1140. This was formerly contained in
two sections but has been incorporated into one and amended to apply only to
public service corporations.
" Note (1909) 7 MicH. L. REv. 239.
. 1 CLARK, REcEIrasHips (2d ed. 1929) §477.
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and a previous one, 29 has added a third exception, namely, that if the
court feels an operating receivership will enure to the benefit of the
secured creditors by making the liquidation of the assets more successful, either by selling them in the usual course of business rather
than by a forced sale or by caring for them pending the sale, then
the court is justified in granting a receivership with the expenses being
first paid out of the fund realized by the sale, although the secured
creditor did not consent thereto.
Where the majority rule is ignored, as in the Armour case, general
creditors of a private corporation are allowed to try the experiment of a
receivership with authority to operate the business in the hope that the
business can be made to pay under the receivership, although it failed
to do so under its officers. This is done at the expense of the nonconsenting secured creditors if the experiment is a failure.
CLAUD WHEATLY, JR.

Taxation-Alimony Trusts-Power of Divorce Court to
Modify as Determining Settlor's Taxability.
In the recent case of Helvering v. Fuller,1 a wife obtained a Nevada
divorce, the decree incorporating and approving a pre-divorce agreement. The agreement provided for an irrevocable trust, created by the
husband, income from which was payable to the wife for ten years for
her support and maintenance, when the corpus was to become hers absolutely; for other property settlements; and for waiver by each of all
claims against the other. Held: Trust income was not taxable to the
husband.
In the companion case of Helvering v. Leonard,2 a wife obtained a
New York divorce, the decree incorporating and approving a pre-divorce
agreement. The agreement provided for the creation by the husband
of an irrevocable trust comprised partly of bonds the principal and
interest of which he guaranteed. The trust income 3 was payable to the
wife for life for her support and maintenance, corpus to be held for
their children on her death. Held: The trust income was taxable to the
husband.
Why this disparity in tax liability growing out of facts essentially
similar, differing only in minor -detail? The opinion in the Leonard
case relies on two distinguishing characteristics which determine the
issue: 1st-Taxpayer Leonard guaranteed the principal and interest on
"' Bank of Pinehurst v. Mid-Pines Country Club, Inc., 208 N. C. 239, 179
S. E. 882 (1935).
1 310 U. S. 69, 60 Sup. Ct. 784, 84 L. ed. 715 (1940).
-310 U. S. 80, 60 Sup. Ct. 780, 84 L. ed. 721 (1940).
'$5000 a year was to be paid to each of three children, remaining amount to
the wife.
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the trusteed bonds; 2nd-he was a party to a divorce obtained in New
York. Obviously the former, subject to the acquiescence of the wife,
was at the outset within his control; and had he chosen to be less generous, that decisive element would have been eliminated. The latter suggests, at least, the advisability of a more discreet choice of jurisdiction.
There is no attempt here to extol the virtues of a tax policy which
in all cases so outlines its requisites as to leave the incidence to the
free discretion of the taxpayer, nor to determine the justice or advisability of taxing one rather than the other party to similar transactions.
However, there is a provocative implication, worthy of pursuit, in the
in readissent of Mr. Justice Reed that "Fine distinctions are necessary
4
soning but most undesirable in a national tax system."1
The controversy centers around the application of the doctrine of
Douglas v. Wilcuts5 to these fact situations. That principle, 6 arising
wholly without the express aid of statute,7 has represented an effort by
the Court to supplement the work of Congress in reducing the effectiveness of the trust as an instrument of tax avoidance. Briefly stated,
it taxes the settlor on the income of any trust, not otherwise so taxable,
which is applied to discharge his legal obligations. Underlying is the
doctrine of "constructive receipt" 8-that having received the benefit of
the income, settlor may not now escape its attendant liabilities merely
because it was directed through the medium of a trust to the payment
of an otherwise non-deductible expense. Hence, the primary requisite
is a "continuing obligation", running from settlor to beneficiary, to
which the income is devoted. In the Douglas case, such an obligation
was found in the general duty of husband to' support wife, made specific by a divorce decree and continuing thereafter. Amounts paid in
discharge of that duty are not deemed income to the wife,9 and a hus'Helvering v.Fuller, 310 U. S.69, 60 Sup. Ct. 784, 789, 84 L. ed. 715, 720

(1940).

r296 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 59, 80 L. ed. 3 (1935).
'See generally MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1939 Cum.
Supp.) §34.168; Bloomenthal, Incoime Tax Aspects of Alimnony Trusts (1939)
17 TAx MAG. 455; Paul, Five Years With Douglas v. Willcuts (1939) 53 HARv.

L. REv. 1; Tye, Federal Taxation of Irrevocable Trusts Re xamibed (April 1940)
18 TAX MAG. 216, 220; Notes (1937) 23 CORN. L. Q. 178, (1939) 52 HAsv. L.
REv. 804, (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 337.

7 Income not received by settlor is expressly taxed to him only under §§166,
167 of the Federal Revenue Act. 52 Stat. 519 (1938), 26 U. S. C. §166 (1940) ;
52 Stat. 519 (1938), 26 U. S. C. §167 (1940). The Court has construed the "gross
income!' provision, 52 Stat. 457 (1938), 26 U. S. C. §22a (1940) as well as 52
Stat. 464 (1938), 26 U. S. C. §24 (1940), relating to non-deductible items, as
covering the maintenance trust situation.
' See Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S.670, 675, 679, 53 Sup. Ct. 761, 763, 764, 77
L. ed. 1439, 1442, 1444 (1933) : Paul, supra note 6, at 6, n. 17.
'Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S.1, 8, 56 Sup. Ct. 59, 62, 80 L. ed. 3, 8 (1935)
citing Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U. S.575, 577, 21 Sup. Ct. 735, 736, 45 L. ed.
1009, 1010 (1901) and Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S.151, 153, 38 Sup. Ct. 53, 62
L. ed. 211, 213 (1917).
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band may receive no deduction for them.10 There the decree of divorce
incorporated the terms of a trust agreement under which the wife would
receive a stipulated annual income "in lieu of, and in full settlement of
alimony, and of any and all dower rights or statutory interests in the estate of" her husband, and "in lieu of any and all claims for separate
maintenance and allowance for her support." Holding the husband taxable on this income, the Court points out that "the income of the trust
fund. . . stands substantially on the same footing as though he had received the income personally and had been required by the decree to make
the payments directly." ' Further, "upon the pre-existing duty of the
husband the decree placed a particular and adequate sanction, and imposed upon the petitioner the obligation to devote the income in ques' 12
tion, through the medium of the trust, to the use of his divorced wife.
The Court dwelled at length on the legal status of such a decree in
Minnesota, pointing out, although not elaborating upon, the power of
the court later to modify the award. That the husband had agreed to
make up deficiencies in the trust income and the property was to revert
to him free of the trust on his wife's death received no consideration in
the opinion.
Subsequently, in Helvering v. Fitch,'3 the Supreme Court disclosed
the importance of the elements undiscussed in the Douglas case, indicating definite limitations to the once broad doctrine. 14 Here the trust,
providing for the separate maintenance of the wife, comprised certain
property, the rent from which was to be paid to her each month during
her life. The corpus was irrevocably alienated by a provision that it
should go to the children on the death of wife and settlor; and no portion of the monthly payments was guaranteed. The divorce decree
confirmed the property and alimony settlement. The Court points out
two factors, absent here, which they feel influenced the result of the
Douglas case: (1) Douglas agreed to make up any deficiencies in the
income; (2) the corpus was to revest in him on the death of his wife.
These, it is said, made it evident that the "alimony trust, which was
approved by the decree, was merely security for a continuing obligation
of the taxpayer to support his divorced wife."1 5 A third factor which
they feel conclusively determined the status of the Douglas trust was
the power of the Minnesota court subsequently to alter and revise its
10 52 Stat. 464 (1938), 26 U. S. C. §24a (1940).
"1 Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1, 9, 56 Sup. Ct. 59, 63, 80 L. ed. 3, 9 (1935).
1
Id. at 8, 56 Sup. Ct. at 62, 80 L. ed. at 8.
309 U. S.149, 60 Sup. Ct. 427, 84 L. ed. 399 (1940).
14 See Bloomenthal, supra note 6, at 457 where it is indicated that the Board
of Tax Appeals has in the past disclosed a tendency to follow the first broad
implications of the doctrine.

" Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U. S.149, -, 60 Sup. Ct. 427, -, 84 L. ed. 399,
400 (1940).
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decree and the provisions therein for the wife's benefit. After ,surveying the law of Iowa, state of the Fitch divorce, they find the husband
taxable, since he has at least not sustained the burden of proving that
no such power exists in the divorce courts of that state.
"If we were to conclude that this case is an exception to that rule
(Douglas v.Willcuts) we would be acting largely on conjecture as to
Iowa law. That we cannot do. For if such a result is to obtain it must
be bottomed on clear and convincing proof, and not on mere inferences
and vague conjectures, that local law and the alimony trust have given
the divorced husband a full discharge and leave no continuing obligation howevier contingent.16 Only in that event can income to the wife
from an alimony trust be treated under the revenue acts the same as
income accruing from property after a debtor has transferred that
property to his creditor in full satisfaction
of his obligation-unless of
course Congress decides otherwise."' 7

Thus, the principle seems to have these limits: 1-The pre-existing
obligation may be terminated; and if it is, the settlor will not be taxable
since there is no longer an obligation to which the trust income is
devoted. Consequently, where this result obtains, the nature of the
trust is altered, and the income therefrom becomes analogous to that
accruing from property which has been transferred from debtor to creditor in full payment of a debt-which, as the Court implies, would
certainly not be taxable to the debtor.' 8 2-But whether the obligation
is so terminated depends upon (a) stipulations in the trust agreement
itself, such as a covenant to make up deficiencies, which leave an obligation continuing after the divorce; or (b) provisions in the state
law, such as the power to modify the tlecree, which have a like effect.
If these factors, or either of them, exist the trust becomes "merely

security for a continuing obligation" to support.
Carried to its logical extreme, and supported by the actual result
of the Fitch case, the ultimate criterion of taxability thus becomes the
power of the divorce court to modify its decree. More than that, the
issue may finally turn upon the ability of the settlor to convince the
Court that no such power exists, for as said in the Leonard case, "all
'
1?

Italics supplied.

Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U. S. 149, -, 60 Sup. Ct. 427, -, 84 L. ed. 399,
403 18(1940).
Although there bas been no express holding, dictum in the Fitch case (see
note 15, supra) indicates that a husband's reversionary interest in the corpus
might prevent the trust from assuming this character. This factor alone might
determine his taxability, since the trust would then seem more nearly a "channel
for the application" of his income than an outright transfer of property. It may
be significant that in the Fuller case, the only one of this series in which the
husband escaped tax, the corpus was to be transferred outright to the wife after
ten years. The effect of remainders over to others than the husband or wife,
such as to their children who would otherwise be the object of his bounty, remains
to be disclosed by future cases where that point alone is present.
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we do hold is that respondent has not shown by 'clear and convincing
proof' that the court lacks the power. . . ."19 Thus, two trusts, 20 identical in every detail, incorporated in decrees granting divorces based
on the same facts, but decided in different states, may have opposite
tax results merely because of fortuitous distinctions in local law.
Recently in Lyeth v. Hoey,2 1 the Court reiterated the rule under
which it adverts to state law in construing the Federal Revenue Act :22
"In dealing with the meaning and application of an act of Congress
enacted in the exercise of its plenary power under the Constitution to
tax income and to grant exemptions from that tax, it is the will of
Congress which controls, and the expression of its will, in the absence
of language evidencing a different purpose, should be interpreted so
as to give a uniform application to a nation-wide scheme of taxation....
Congress establishes its own criteria and the state law may control only
when the federal taxing act by express language or'23necessary implication makes its operation dependent upon state law."
Obviously, where the statute is expressly dependent upon state law,
the Court is powerless to avoid any inequities which may result from
local legal divergencies. However, when the statute is silent and the
question becomes one of legislative intent, the Court is in a favorable
position to effect "a uniform application" of the tax. Thus, where a

particular economic result or benefit is the criterion for the tax, state
law may be applied to establish its existence; but where the result or
benefit exists independently of its characterization in local law, that
law may be disregarded. 2 4 For example, whether title to certain property has passed is, for most purposes, a matter of state law ;25 whether
it has passed by "inheritance" or otherwise is exclusively a federal
question. 26 However, an anomalous situation has arisen where, in construing the "gross income" provision, the Court has given effect to the
characterization of income by the community property states, which is
unlike that obtaining elsewhere.2 7 As many authorities contend, the
"' Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U. S. 80, -, 60 Sup. Ct. 780, 784, 84 L. ed.
721, 724 (1940).
2 Compare 1-elvering v. Fuller, 310 U. S. 69, 60 Sup. Ct. 784, 84 L. ed. 715
(1940) with Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U. S. 149, 60 Sup. Ct. 427, 84 L. ed. 399
(1940).
21305 U. S. 188, 59 Sup. Ct. 155, 83 L. ed. 119 (1938).

2 See generally, PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION (2nd Ser.
1-52; 5 PAUL & MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL IlNcoE TAXATION (1934)

1938)

§53.38; Note (1934) 34 CoL. L. Rzv. 526.
2 Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U. S. 188, 194, 59 Sup. Ct. 155, 158, 83 L. ed. 119, 124
(1938).
2' Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U. S. 110, 46 Sup. Ct. 48, 70
L. ed. 183 (1925); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103, 53 Sup. Ct. 74, 77 L. ed.
199 (1932).
22 See 5 PAUL & MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 22, at 863.

2Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U. S. 188. 59 Sup. Ct. 155, 83 L. ed. 119 (1938).
Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101, 51 Sup. Ct. 58, 75 L. ed. 239 (1930) (holding each spouse taxable on only one-half of community income, since under state
27
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consequence has been gross inequality in tax results although the economic benefits are identical. 28 For the most part, however, the court
has achieved singular success in this endeavor to distribute the tax
burden equally. Since this expedient is an outgrowth of that judicial
and legislative approach to tax questions which seeks substance rather
than form of taxable transactions, 29 no definite rules may be evolved as
a guide to future cases. The course followed in each case must necessarily vary with the nature of the tax, the subject, and the policy to be
effectuated. That the Court should be left free to effectuate a clear
policy of Congress is not to be questioned; but where the procedure
adapted to that end involves inequities plainly unforeseeable by Congress, the Court should await its more detailed articulation.
In taxing the income from alimony trusts, the statute by whose
implication the Court has justified its advertence to state law merely
says that no deduction shall be allowed for "family expenses" in computing net income.30 That this statute covers the present situation is
clear when it is recalled that payment of such an expense by the income
from an irrevocable trust is, in effect, an attempt by a circuitous route
to receive a prohibited deduction. Thus, by indirection, the Court has
reasoned that payments to a divorced wife are in discharge of a "family
expense" where the obligation to support continues-the continuance of
that obligation depending ultimately upon the power of the divorce
court to modify its decree. Therefore, state law is applied to determine
if that power exists.
A general survey will disclose that the conditions under which this
power may be exercised vary considerably from state to state and often
in a manner wholly unrelated to basic rights or liabilities of the husband.3 ' But accepting the basic premise of the Court that the power to
modify will render the obligation to support continuing and the trust a
mere security for that obligation, a recourse to state law is inescapable
since the condition upon which the tax attaches may only be found
there. However, such recourse may at the same time result in a lack
of uniformity in the incidence of the tax if the power to modify has
merely a theoretical rather than a substantial effect on the present relation of the divorced couple.
Whether this effect upon the nature of the "post-marital" relation
law wife technically had a "vested" interest as distinguished from an "expectancy"
in the
income.) MAGI L, TAXABLE INCOME (1936) 268-274.
"8 See PAUL, op. cit. smpra note 22, at 40-44; Altman, Community Property:
Avoiding Avoidance by Adoption in the Revenue Act (1938) 16 TAx MAG. 138.
2 See Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 677, 53 Sup. Ct 761, 763, 77 L. ed.
1439, 1443, (1933).
" 52 Stat. 464 (1938), 26 U. S. C. §24a (1940).
.'See Note (1937) 109 A. L. R. 1068; also see Note (1940) 40 COL. L. REv.
677, 679, n. 17.
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is substantive or merely formal is a question of the most abstruse logic.
However that may be, the economic relation of husband to wife is identical except in one respect; i.e. where the power exists, the husband
may be later called upon to add to the settlement previously approved.
As a practical matter, what substantial obligation is being discharged
by his trust income which is not also being discharged by that of the
husband more fortunately residenced? What benefits accruing to the
former are denied the latter? Far from being continuing, the obligation
to further contribute has yet to arise. Yet, the Court would answer,
"the existence of wholly contingent obligations-is adequate to support
the results reached in Douglas v. Willcuts .... ,,"2 To the practical

mind this might suggest that the contingent obligation is being discharged by trust income; therefore, settlor is taxable. Obviously this
is not true in the sense that the specific obligation has arisen. Then
does it mean that the contingent obligation is subject to being discharged by trust income once the contingency has occurred? Not only
would such reasoning seem to remove the case from the basic rule since
in fact the obligation is not now being so discharged, but it also seems,
at b~st, a half-truth since, when the obligation does arise (unless there
is a re-allocation of trust income), it might be discharged in ways
wholly unrelated to the trust originally set up. Clearly, the meaning is
simply that since there is a possibility of the husband's having to contribute further, the decree does not make his general duty to support
sufficiently definitive to be subject to absolute discharge in the same
manner that a liquidated debt is satisfied by a lump sum settlement;
thus, the duty to support continues. Certainly there may be contingent
liabilities remaining, such as those arising from the trust agreement
itself, which lend more definite reality to this position. But granted that
where the power to modify exists, the husband is not completely discharged, the possibility of its exercise seems of too little consequence
in most cases to justify its being designated as the dividing line between
taxability and non-taxability. If the power were never exercised,
clearly the actual nature of the post-marital relation would have been
the same as if no such power had ever existed, whatever its abstract
nature might have been. The logic of the Court seems to depend upon
a distinction without a substantial difference, and results in a disparity
of treatment not justified by a difference in practical enjoyment or
benefit.
The Court might well have viewed the power to modify, not as
assuming the continuance of an obligation to support, but rather as
referable to a public policy which authorizes adjustments of post-marital
2

Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U. S. 80, -, 60 Sup. Ct. 780, 783, 84 L. ed. 721,

723 (1940).
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financial arrangements as exigencies arise. If, in that event, the trust
approved by the decree appeared to be in final satisfaction of the obligation made specific by that judgment itself, the continuity of the general
duty to support would be broken; and the obligation would exist only
as and when declared in a modifying judgment. Should the new decree
place burdens upon the husband which are discharged in a manner
unconnected with the original trust, it is clear that the trust payments
should not have been taxed to him. Thus, not the mere potentiality of
its exercise, but the exercise of the power itself in the form of a modifying judgment, which prescribed new obligations and the manner of
their discharge, would be looked to in determining taxability. Not only
does this view seem to conform more closely to the realities of the situation; but also its adoption would eliminate the inequities which arise
from the use of a criterion found in local law, the effect whose existence or non-existence is more often theoretical than real.
Although the uniformity of tax incidence guaranteed by the Constitution is "geographic" rather than "intrinsic", 3 and a statute conforming to the present view of the Court would no doubt be sustained on
this ground, it is highly desirable from the point of view of both the
Government and the taxpayer to avoid any inequalities not justified by
considerations peculiar to the particular tax.34 No such considerations
are apparent here. The uncertainties inherent in the present holdings
suggest the need of a statute expressly designed to cover the maintenance trust situation. Meanwhile, rather than to adopt a policy which
often permits discrimination, the Court might well have sanctioned a
tax upon the settlor in all such cases, an approach which the dissent
asserts is most consistent with the choice first made in Douglas v. Willcuts. 35 But whether a statute is forthcoming, it should be strongly emphasized that insistence upon highly doctrinary theory will not always
assure that reality of treatment which the Court itself has so often
encouraged and tax administration demands.
E. H. SEAWELL.
Torts-Municipal Corporations-Liability foT Death or
Injury to Prisoner.
Two recent North Carolina cases1 involve injuries committed by
one prisoner on a fellow-prisoner. It is significant to note that on
" Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41,
Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12, 47 Sup.
" See PAUL, op. cit. supra note 22, at
"See Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U. S.

715, 720 (1940).

20 Sup. Ct. 747, 44 L. ed. 969 (1900);
Ct. 265, 71 L. ed. 511 (1927).
49-52.
69, -, 60 Sup. Ct. 784, 789, 84 L. ed.

'Dunn v. Swanson, 217 N. C. 279, 7 S. E. (2d) 563 (1940) ; Parks v. Princeton, 217 N. C. 361, 8 S. E. (2d) 217 (1940).
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strikingly similar facts different statutes were invoked, a different class
of &tefendantsnamed, and different results reached. These variances
make pertinent an investigation of the contrasting liabilities where suit
has been against the individual officers, against the town, against the
county and against the state.
A. Suits Against the Individual Officers
In the principal case of Dunn v. Swanson, suit was against the

sheriff, jailer and surety company for jailer's negligence in putting X
in a cell with a prisoner whom the jailer knew to be violently insane,
and who beat X to death with a table leg. Recovery was allowed under
C. S. 3542 which provides that a sheriff and his surety shall be civilly
liable, on an officer's bond, for "all acts done by said officer by virtue
or under color of his office". Prior to the addition of the words "under
color of" to the statute in 1883, recovery had been limited to instances
where the injury resulted from a type of negligence specifically enumerated in the 'bond.3 After such statutory change, several decisions
correctly effectuated the legislative purpose of increasing the scope of
liability.4 Then in two later decisions the court inconsistently reverted
to the old precedents, ignoring the broadened scope of the statute.6
Price v. Honeycutt6 and the principal case apparently represent a return to a liberal construction of the statute, and in so doing accord with
the general rule that a prison official is liable when he knows of, or
in the exercise of reasonable care should anticipate, danger to the prisoner, and with such knowledge or anticipation fails to take the proper

IN. C.

CoDE ANr. (Michie, 1939) §354.
' Crumpler v. Governor, 12 N. C. 52 (1826) (surety not liable for sheriff's
failure to collect tax not mentioned in bond) ; State v. Long, 30 N. C. 415 (1848)
(surety not liable for sheriff's taking cash money in lieu of bail bond) ; Eaton v.
Kelly, 72 N. C. 110 (1875) (surety not liable for unauthorized sale conducted
by sheriff) ; Holt v. McLean, 75 N. C. 347 (1876) (surety not liable for register
of deed's issuance of marriage license to girl under age).
"Kivett v. Young, 106 N. C. 567, 10 S. E. 1019 (1890) (register of deeds
and surety liable for failure to properly record a deed when bond specifically
covered such duty); Joyner v. Roberts, 112 N. C. 111, 16 S. E. 917 (1893);
Daniel v. Grisette, 117 N. C. 105, 23 S. E. 93 (1895) (register of deeds liable on
bond for failure properly to index a mortgage); Warren v. Boyd, 120 N. C.
56, 26 S. E. 700 (1897) (constable liable on bond for illegal arrest and false
imprisonment).
Sutton v. Williams, 199 N. C. 546, 155 S. E. 160 (1930); Davis v. Moore,
215 N. C. 449, 2 S. E. (2d) 366 (1939). Explaining its switch from these latter
two cases to the present view in the Dunn case, the court said: "A re-examination of the authorities convinced the court that . . . the court was not justified
in ignoring the -plain terms of the statute as it had been correctly interpreted and
applied in Kiveit v. Young, and other cases decided after its passage, all, of
course, subsequent to Crumpler v. Governor, 12 N. C. 52, and other decisions of
a similar nature rendered prior to the statute. It is only fair to say that in Davis
v. Moore neither the correcting statute nor the cases interpreting it were called to
the attention of the court."
0 216 N. C. 270, 4 S. E. (2d) 611 (1939).
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precautions to safeguard his prisoners.7 No test of what constitutes
"reasonable care" has been prescribed by our court, but a case from
another jurisdiction intimates that it at the least extends to searching
incoming prisoners for any possible weapons.8
-Only one North Carolina decision deals with the liability of an
officer for wilful injuries,9 and it is one of the'two aforementioned instances in which the court narrowly construed C. S. 354 and refused
recovery on the bond. Yet recovery was allowed under C. S. 4407,
which provides that any keeper of a jail who shall do or cause any
unlawful injury to the prisoners in his charge shall pay treble damages
to the person injured and be guilty of a misdemeanor. Apparently this
statute had never before been cited in its 145 years of existence, and
even in this case was not adhered to by the court in its assessment of
damages. Explanation for the signal- lack of reliance on this statute
perhaps lies in the fact that no cases involving wilful injuries have
arisen, and also in the belief that such a statute was designed to supplement rather than to substitute for the common law action. Seemingly
our court holds an officer responsible for any excessive and unnecessary injuries, whether occasioned by acts within the scope of his employment or ultra ziresY° Since the principal case overrules the prior
narrow construction of C. S. 354, liability will extend to the bonding
surety except in those cases where the officer acts beyond his powers
and so assumes sole responsibility. 1
B. Suits Against the City or Town
Suits against a municipality for injury or death of a prisoner
ordinarily involve the question of adequate furnishings of a jail in regard to health and sanitation. The usual rule is that maintenance of
a city jail is a governmental (as distinguished from a proprietary) func'Gunther v. Johnson, 36 App. Div. 437, 55 N. Y. Supp. 869 (2d Dep't 1899)
(sheriff not liable for damages inflicted by assault as he knew Pf no trouble in
jail) ; Hixon v. Cupp, 5 Okla. 545, 49 Pac. 927 (1897) (sheriff and surety liable
for injuries inflicted by "kangaroo court" as he knew of its existence and danger) ; Stinnett v. Sherman, 43 S. W. 847 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897) (chief of police
not liable to prisoner attacked by insane cell-mate when he knew of neither's
-presence); Riggs v. German, 81 Wash. 128, 142 Pac. 479 (1914) (sheriff knew
of "kangaroo court" but not liable for injuries inflicted by it since there was no
evidence that he knew or had reason to know that prisoners contemplated an assault on plaintiff).
8 Kusah v. McCorkle, 100 Wash. 318, 170 Pac. 1023 (1918)
(sheriff liable for
failure to search insane cell-mate who attacked plaintiff) ; cf. Gunther v. Johnson,
36 App. Div. 437, 55 N. Y. Supp. 869 (2d Dep't 1899).
'Davis v. Moore, 215 N. C. 449, 2 S. E. (2d) 366 (1939) (deputy closed door
on plaintiff's thumb).
"0Hobbs v. Washington, 168 N. C. 293, 84 S. E. 391 (1915), see note 24,
infra; for cases from other jurisdictions so holding see Note (1927) A. L. R.
111. For the proposition that an officer may be personally liable although not
liable on his bond, see Holt v. McLean, 75 N. C. 347 (1876).
" Sutton v. Williams, 199 N. C. 546, 155 S. E. 160 (1930).
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tion,12 and therefore the municipality is not liable to a prisoner for
injuries due to improper construction or negligent maintenance.' 3 North
Carolina departs from the general rule insofar as liability is imposed
by Article XI, Section 6, of the Constitution, which provides that
"ecompetent legislation" shall require that the "structure and superintendence" of penal institutions of the state, city and county "secure the
health and comfort" of the prisoners. What will satisfy the constitutional requirement as to "structure" is uncertain, but apparently almost
any pretense is sufficient, for Nichols v. Fountain,1 4 held adequate a
second floor cell in a frame building which caught fire in the absence
of any attendants and burned the prisoner to death. Speaking in ambiguous generalities, the court said that there was no liability as long
as the jail was constructed properly and "reasonable provision" made
for comfort and protection. Should a town be held blameless for locking up and deserting a prisoner in a cell manifestly dangerous? Was
"reasonable provision" made for comfort and safety when no guard
was near to rescue from just such an eventuality? Other jurisdictions
answer affirmatively. 15 But encouragingly, the court has held that an
8 by 14 foot cell underneath a garbage-strewn marketplace helped "accelerate" 'death "by the noxious air of the guardhouse", and further
intimated that absence of a chair, bed, blanket, would attach liability
to the city.' 6
The legislation enacted pursuant to the Constitutional requirement
makes it the duty of the sheriff or keeper of a jail to cleanse daily the
cells of the prisoners, to furnish adequate food and water, fuel, and
"every necessary attendance".' 7 Six cases have arisen under this law,
and only twice were facilities found sufficiently inadequate to warrant
recovery.' 8 No recovery for injuries 'due to unsanitary conditions has
" For a textual statement of the distinction, see 6 McQuILLEN,
CORPORATIONS (6th ed. 1928) §§2795 to 2798.
114 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th

MUNICIPAL

ed. 1911) §1656. Contra, Edwards
v. Pocahontas, 47 Fed. 268 (C. C. W. D. Va. 1891) (city not absolutely required
to maintain a jail and, if it does so, it is liable).
x,165 N. C. 166, 80 S. E. 1059 (1914).
(prisoner died
" McAuliffe v. Victor, 15 Colo. App. 337, 62 Pac. 231 (1900)
in jail that burned through negligence of jailer); Alvord v. Richmond, 3 Ohio
N. P. 136 (1896) (town not liable for negligence of jailer in not watching fire
in faulty stove-but officials liable for plaintiff's death); Carty v. Winooski, 78
Vt. 104, 62 AtI. 45 (1905) (plaintiff suffocated by fumes from fire of unknown
origin in mattress); Brown v. Guyandotte, 34 W. Va. 299, 12 S. E. 707 (1890)
(jail consumed by fire while keeper was away) ; McKenzie v. Chilliwhack, 15
B. C. 256 (1909) (prisoner burned to death by fire of unknown origin during
duties).
of jailer
temporary
229 (1887).
"SLewisabsence
v. Raleigh,
77 N.onC.official
(Michie, 1939) §1346.
17 N. C. CODE ANN.
Recovery allowed: Lewis v. Raleigh, 77 N. C. 229 (1877) ; Shields v. Durham, 118 N. C. 450, 24 S. E. 794 (1896) (on rehearing). Recovery denied:
Moffitt v. Asheville, 103 N. C. 237, 9 S. E. 695 (1889) ; Shields v. Durham, 116.
N. C. 394, 21 S. E. 402 (1895); Coley v. Statesville, 121 N. C. 301, 28 S. E. 482
(1897) ; Hobbs v. Washington, 168 N. C. 293, 84 S. E. 391 (1915).
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been allowed since the turn of the century. This may be attributed less
to the indifference of the court regarding jail conditions than to the
improvement brought about in jail standards by the regular inspections
of the State Board of Health and the Board of Charities and Public
Welfare.' 9
Notice has several times been held prerequisite to a city's liability.
An early case permitted recovery without mention of the necessity that
the city have knowledge of the inadequacy, saying: "No question arises
as to how far the city is liable for the misconduct of its officials, because
the act complained of (leaving the prisoner in an unsanitary cell) is
the act of the city itself." 20 In the next case against a city, 21 for a
jailer's failure to replace broken windows and worn-out bedding, the
court held that there was no liability in the absence of a showing that
the governing officers of the town had actual notice of the condition, but
intimated that if they had such notice and retained incompetent or careless jailers after awareness of their negligent character, there would be
liability. A long-standing condition of filth and neglect was held sufficient notice in Shields v. Durham2 2 particularly since the chief of police
informally told the commissioners of the bad facilities. A final opinion 23 held that knowledge of the chief of police concerning defective
jail equipment was not adequate notice to impose liability, unle~s communicated. This leaves the question of what constitutes notice shrouded
with uncertainty; but any requirement of notice appears unjust and
contrary to the rule that knowledge of the agent is knowledge of the
principal. The interests of justice would seem better served if the court
imposed liability on a showing that the city had allowed jail conditions
to fall below the constitutional and statutory standards. Such a change
might well prompt a salutary civic alertness and concern.
In the principal case of Parks v. Princeton, the city was held not
liable for the negligence of the jail-keeper in putting an unsearched
and violent drunk in a cell with the plaintiff, when the drunk wrappeol
the sleeping plaintiff in an inflammable mattress and set fire to it.
justification was supplied. by the time-worn formula that a municipality
has no liability for injuries arising out of the performance of a governmental function. The plaintiff introduced evidence to show lack of
lights, toilet facilities, ventilation, and proper bedding, apparently seek" N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§5008, 7050.
"oLewis v. Raleigh, 77 N. C. 229, 231 (1877).
21 Moffitt v. Asheville, 103 N. C. 237, 9 S. E. 695 (1889).
.2 Shields v. Durham, 118 N. C. 450, 24 S. E. 794 (1896)
(plaintiff's feet
frozen in filthy cell with window glass out and insufficient bedding).
2"Coley v. Statesville, 121 N. C. 301, 28 S. E. 482 (1897) (plaintiff died from

filth and poor ventilation of jail). Absence of the requirement of notice in other
jurisdictions is probably due to the fact that such jurisdictions have no statute
comparable to C. S. 1346.
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ing to recover on the basis of the town's failure to meet the required
standards of construction and supervision, but the court declared that,
even conceding sub-standard conditions, there was no causal connection
between such omissions and the injury of the plaintiff.24 Seemingly
the court might with more equity have decided oppositely on both rulings. First, the immunity of governmental units, particularly municipalities, to suits of this nature is open to strong criticism. 28 No longer
does close adherence to this antiquated precedent promote justice or
adequately protect the public under modern conditions of society. Secondly, assuming the prison conditions to have violated the constitutionally-imposed standard, causal connection might reasonably have been
found in the utter lack of any safety appliance or means of summoning
help to meet such an emergency.
Had the plaintiff sued the sheriff under C. S. 354 on the basis of
his deputy's negligence in placing the violent drunk in the same cell,
chances of recovery would seem excellent, for such a prisoner was
foreseeably dangerous, and the exercise of reasonable care would seem
to demand a search of the inebriated prisoner for matches or other dangerous instruments before admitting him. 26 Suit under such a theory
is obviously easier of proof than an attempt to establish (assuming a
causal connection): (1) violation by the city of a loosely construed
constitutional standard of maintenance, and (2) notice of such violation by the city.
C. Suits Against the County and the State
No exception has been found in this state to the general rule that
counties are not liable for injuries to prisoners in the absence of some
specific statute.2 7 In two instances 28 recovery was denied against a
"In Hobbs v. Washington, 168 N. C. 293, 84 S. E. 391 (1915), the town
and sheriff were joint defendants and no liability attached to the town for the
ultra vires act of a county official in putting plaintiff in the city jail where he
suffered from filth and exposure, yet the officer was held personally responsible.
Would not the city have been liable if, (1) the plaintiff had been arrested by
an authorized city officer, and placed in the contaminating city jail, or, (2) the
city and county jointly provided jail facilities?
2The dissenting opinion of Justice Wanamaker in Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N. E. 72 (1919), although little followed in later deci-

sions, is the classic revolt against the immunity rule. For comment on this decision, see Notes (1920) 54 Am. L. REv. 916; (1920) 20 Co. L. REv. 772; (1919)
5 CORN. L. Q. 90; (1920) 34 HARv. L. REV. 66; (1920) 18 MicH. L. REV. 708;
(1920) 4 MINN. L. REV. 460; (1921) 7 VA. L. REv. 383; (1920) 29 YALE L. J.
911.
"Kusah v. McCorkle, 100 Wash. 318, 170 Pac. 1023 (1918) (sheriff held
liable for failure of deputy to search insane prisoner before committing him).
27The general rule and an analysis of the cases thereunder will be found in:
Notes (1906) 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 95; (1924) 31 A. L. R. 293; (1929) 61 A. L. R.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) §1640.
569;3 4 DILLONr,
" Manuel v. Board of Commr's, 98 N. C. 9, 3 S.E. 826 (1887); Moye v.
McLawhorn, 208 N. C.812, 182 S.E. 493 (1935).
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county and its commissioners for injuries sustained in the county jail.
In one case non-liability for injuries resulting from the negligent failure to provide blankets was rationalized by a recital of the rule that a
county, being a subdivision of the state, is immunized against the acts
of its agents in the absence of an express statute. 29 Other states would
hold the jailer personally liable,30 and C. S. 354 warrants North Carolina in likewise holding a sheriff and his surety liable for failure to
provide heat or food, or for injurious subjection to unnecessary filth.
The second case 3 ' is comparable to the principal cases in that injury
arose from actions of fellow-prisoners who subjected the plaintiff to a
mock trial by their "kangaroo court" and, upon his refusal to pay a
fine, severely beat him. The county commissioners knew of the illicit
court, but had taken no steps to safeguard newly admitted prisoners.
Instead of suing the sheriff upon his statutory bond,3 2 the plaintiff
elected to rely on C. S. 1317, requiring the commissioners to pass regulations governing the prisoners; but the court held the statute to impose
only a "discretionary" duty, and that only on proof of corrupt and
33

malicious motives would the commissioners incur individual liability.
The immunity of a sovereign state to suit3 4 (without its consent)

and the inapplicability of the rule of respondeat superior to agents of
the state effectively prevent recovery against the state for injuries to
prisoners. North Carolina has held the state .prison non-suable in the
absence of express statute, 35 and has also exempted the state from liabil"' Manuel v. Board of Commr's, 98 N. C. 9, 3 S. E. 829 (1887). This case
also discusses the distinction between the liabilities of city and county, which
distinction is further commented on in Note (1934) 12 N. C. L. REV. 172.
1"Topeka v. Boutwell, 53 Kan. 20, 35 Pap. 819 (1894); Nixa v. McMullin,
198 Mo. App. 1, 193 S. W. 596 (1917) (marshal liable for placing plaintiff in
unsanitary cell); Richardson v. Capwell, 63 Utah 616, 176 Pac. 205 (1918)
(marshal liable for exposing prisoner to cold, poor food, and unsanitary conditions) ; Clark v. Kelly, 101 W. Va. 650, 133 S. E. 365 (1926) (jailer liable for
placing plaintiff in unsanitary jail); cf. Martin v. Moore, 99 Md. 41, 57 Atl.
671 (1904); Williams v. Adams, 3 Allen 171 (Mass. 1861) (prisoner confined
in house of correction recovered against master for negligent failure to furnish
food, heat, and clothes); Rose v. Toledo, 24 Ohio C. C. 540 (1903); Lunsford
v. Johnson, 132 Tenn. 615, 179 S. W. 151 (1915); Bishop v. Lucy, 21 Tex. Civ.
App. 326, 50 S. W. 1029 (1899) (neither policeman nor marshal liable for janitor's transfer of prisoner to filthy cell, in absence of showing that defendants
were responsible for condition of cell, or had ordered the transfer, or were aware
of it).
" Moye v. McLawhorn, 208 N. C. 812, 182 S. E. 493 (1935).
. For the view that a recovery could have been obtained in such event: Ratcliff v. Stanley, 224 Ky. 819, 7 S. W. (2d) 230 (1928) ; Hixon v. Cupp, 5 Okla.
545, 49 Pac. 927 (1897); Taylor v. Slaughter, 171 Okla. 152, 42 P. (2d) 235
(1935) ; Eberhart v. Murphy, 110 Wash. 158, 188 Pac. 17 (1920). In each of
these cases there was a "kangaroo court" whose existence and dangerous propensities were known to the jailer.
" Authority for the latter statement is contained in Hipps v. Ferrall, 173
N. C. 167, 91 S.E. 831 (1917).
McGuire, State Liability for Tort (1916) 30 IAav. L. REV. 20.
Moody v. State's Prison, 128 N. C. 12, 38 S. E. 131 (1901).
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ity where a convict was injured through negligence of a state supervisor
while working on the streets (a proprietary function to which liability
ordinarily attaches).3 6
An investigation of other jurisdictions reveals cases of fellow-prisoner injuries analagous to the two principal cases, and in no instance
has a city been held liable for the negligence of its agents in not regulating prisoners more carefully.37 However, where suit has been against
the individual bonded, officer, there has been recovery in nearly all cases
in which the officer knew or should have known of the danger to the
prisoner.38 Thus the knowledge rule has extended not only to "kangaroo court" and direct assault cases, but to a situation where a prisoner
caught small-pox due to the jailer's failure to isolate an inmate known
to be diseased,3 9 and to a situation where the sheriff knew of an in40
mate's wounds but failed. to secure medical aid.
Thus North Carolina accords with the weight of authority in granting recovery when the sheriff is defendant and denying it when the
town is defendant, on substantially identical fact-situations. From a
social point of view the result reached in the Parks case is palpably undesirable, yet remedy lies only iif a statutory imposition of liability on
town and county for negligence in the exercise of its "governmental"
functions.
CHARLES EDWIN HINSDALE.
Workmen's Compensation-Injury from Personal Assault
as Arising Out of Employment.
While at work, P was jeeringly taunted by his supervisor until he
retaliated with abusive language. Thereupon the supervisor struck and
injured P. Recovery was allowed under Workman's Compensation
Act.1
Admittedly the injury occurred in the "course of employment."
But it is highly controversial whether an assault flowing from purely
personal bickering may be said to "arise out of employment." Difficulty inheres in the necessity of establishing 2a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the employment.
" Clodfelter v. State, 86 N. C. 51 (1882).
"In each case the jailer had reason to anticipate the danger from the prisoner, but liability was denied against the city on the basis of immunity to suit
for injuries arising out of governmental functions.
"8See note 31, supra.
"Hunt v. Rawton, 14 Okla. 181, 288 Pac. 342 (1930).
46 Moxley v. Roberts, 43 S. W. 482 (Ky. 1897).
'Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F. (2d) 1b (App. D. C.
1940).
'Coronado Beach Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 682, 158 Pac. 212 (1916); Connelly v. Samaritan Hospital, 259 N. Y. 137, 181 N. E. 76 (1932).
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The potential flexibility of the phrase "out of employment" has been
wielded with increasing liberality in favor of injured employees.3 Where
employment leads to passage along public streets, injuries from vehicles, 4 slipping or tripping, 5 falling objects,0 and explosions 7 are compensable. Justification is found in the forced. exposure to the risks of
the street, even though such risks are common to the public and not
peculiar to the employee. Recovery is further allowed where presence
on the street is casual and collateral to employment, as where occasioned
by telephoning" or seeking a toilet. 9 Narrower construction occurs in
a North Carolina holding that a mad dog bite was not compensable
although the bitten employee was at his post of work.10
Illustration of the liberal trend occurs also in cases involving accidental shooting. Compensable injury occurred to a traveling representa12
1
tive shot on a station platform, ' to a janitor shot while cleaning steps,
and to a waiter by a gun being cleaned by a policeman.' 3 In such cases
North Carolina, however, holds fast to the moderate view, and does not
allow compensation unless the nature of the employment subjects the
employee to the particular hazard.- Hence no recovery was allowed an
4
employee shot by a boy hunting sparrows.'
"Horseplay" cases reveal varying degrees of liberality. Most jurisdictions allow recovery where the injured worker was a non-participant;15 some allow recovery despite the injured worker's participation
'McLaughlin v. Davies Lumber Co., 220 Ala. 440, 125 So. 608 (1929);
Billiter, Miller & McClure v. Hickman, 247 Ky. 211, 56 S. W. (2d) 1002 (1933);
Industrial Comm. of Ohio v. Weigandt, 102 Ohio St. 1, 130 N. E. 38 (1921).
'Western Pacific R. R. v. Industrial Accident Comm. of Cal., 193 Cal. 413,
224 Pac. 754 (1925) ; Cook's Case, 243 Mass. 572, 137 N. E. 733 (1923).
'McCullough v. Pittsburgh Glass Co., 107 Conn. 164, 140 Atl. 114 (1927);
New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Hoage, 62 F. (2d) 468 (App. D. C. 1932);
Redner v. K. C. Faber & Son Co., 223 N. Y. 379, 119 N. E. 482 (1918).
'Mahold v. Thompson-Starrett Co., 134 Minn. 113, 158 N. W. 913 (1916).
'Kozdeba v. People's Gas Light & Coke Co., 232 Ill. App. 495 (1924);
Roberts v. J. F. Newcombe and Co., 201 App. Div. 759, 195, N. Y. Supp. 405
(3d Dep't 1922).
Mueller Const. Co. v. Industrial Brd., 283 Ill. 148, 118 N. E. 1028 (1918).
'Zabriskie v. Erie R. R., 86 N. J. L. 266, 92 Atl. 384 (1914).
1" Plemmons v. White's Service, 213 N. C. 148, 195 S. E. 370 (1938) ; Bodenheimer v. Ragan, 3 N. C. I. C. 95 (1931). But see Katz v. Radans, 232 N. Y.
420, 134 N. E. 330 (1922) (Employee stabbed by insane man while filling employer's truck).
.. Frigidaire Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 103 Cal. App. 27, 283 Pac.
974 (1929).
12 Greenberg v. Voit, 250 N. Y. 543, 116 N. E. 318 (1929).
's Entrocut v. Paramount Bakery & Restaurant Co., 222 App. Div. 844, 226
N. Y. Supp. 808 (3rd Dep't 1928).
"Bain v. Travora Mfg. Co., 203 N. C. 466, 166 S. E. 301 (1932); Whitley
v. N. C. State Highway Comm., 201 N. C. 539, 160 S. E. 827 (1931) (Claimant
shot by hunter while working on employer's truck). Contra: Boris Const. Co.
v. Haywood, 214 Ala. 162, 106 So. 799 (1925) (Compensation allowed in identical
case).
1 Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N. Y. 470, 128 N. E. 711 (1920);
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provided such "horseplay" was a common occurrence and so known
to the employer.' 6 A few permit compensation even where the "horse17
play" was neither customary nor within the employer's knowledge.
These latter decisions lean heavily upon a doctrine that outbursts of
"horseplay" are inevitable by-products of continuous human association
and accordingly "arise out of employment." Such a rationale is succinctly put by Judge Cardozo: "The claimant's presence in the factory
in association with other workmen involved exposure to risk of injury
from the careless acts of those about him....
Whatever men and boys
will do, when gathering together in such surroundings,, at all events if
it is something reasonably expected was one of the perils of his serv18
ice.''
Where an employee suffers a wilful assault from either a fellow
workman' 9 or a third person, 20 compensation is contingent upon
whether the altercation bore any relation to the employment. North
Carolina adheres to this view. 21 Other cases have anticipated the principal decision and allowed recovery for assaults unrelated to the employment, and even where the injured claimant was guilty of provocation. Injury was held to have risen "out of employment", where a
22
co-worker made a sudden assault merely to satisfy personal spleen,
where the claimant was shot by an employee who returned intoxicated
Chambers v. Union Oil Co. Inc., 199 N. C. 28, 163 S. E. 594 (1930); Badger
Furniture Co. v. Industrial Comm., 195 Wis. 134, 217 N. E. 734 (1928); Notes
(1921) 13 A. L. R. 540, (1925) 36 A. L. R. 469, (1926) 43 A. L. R. 492.
" Kokomo Steel & Wire Co. v. Irick, 80 Ind. App. 610, 141 N. E. 769 (1923);
Anderson v. Kerr State Industrial Comm., 155 Okla. 137, 7 P. (2d) 902 (1932);
Note (1930) 9 N. C. L. REv. 105.
" East Ohio Gas Co. v. Coe, 420 Ohio App. 610, 182 N. E. 123 (1923)
(Claimant in jest took ruler from co-worker, and struggle followed resulting in
fatal injury); Brown v. Vacuum Oil Co., 171 La. 707, 132 So. 117 (1930)
(Claimant sprinkled a co-worker in fun; latter attempted to take hose and injured former); Note (1932) 46 HARv. L. REV. 166.
18 Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N. Y. 470, 471, 128 N. E. 711,
712 (1920).
"gGlobe Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 193 Cal. 470, 225 Pac.
273 (1924); Little v. Atlas Drop-Forge Co., 221 Mich. 604, 192 N. W. 619
(1923) ; Janchimsky v. E. U. Bliss Co., 198 App. Div. 8, 189 N. Y. Supp. 154 (3d
Dep't 1923); Brown, Arising out of Employment (1932) 8 Wis. L. REV. 217;
Note (1933) B. U. L. REv. 184; Note (1936) 8 RocKY MT. L. Ray. 301.
2 Ex Parte Terry, 211 Ala. 418, 100 So. 768 (1924); Clark v. Industrial
Comm., 356 I1. 641, 191 N. E. 209 (1934); Rosmuth American Radiator Co.,
200 App. Div. 207, 193 N. Y. Supp. 769 (3d Dep't 1922).
" Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., 198 N. C. 723, 153 S. E. 266 (1930);
Winberry v. Farley Stores, Inc., 204 N. C. 79, 167 S. E. 476 (1933); Wilson v.
Boyd & Goforth, 207 N. C. 344, 177 S. E. 178 (1934).
V Grosberg v. H. and H. Taxi Corp., 250 App. Div. 804, 294 N. Y. Supp. 201
(3d Dep't 1937) (Claimant accused of being a chiseler and assaulted by fellow
employee) ; Ferguson v. Cady-McFarland Gravel Co., 156 La. 871, 101 So. 248
(1924) (Claimant while in stooping position was suddenly struck on head by a
co-worker). In both cases there is a strong indication that the assault was not
due merely to personal ill-will but originated from the work.
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while off duty ;23 where claimant was stabbed by an insane stranger ;24
and where the claimant provoked an assault by abusive language.25 Yet
where an employee was injured in an assault which he initiated as aggressor, recovery was denied. 26 None of the cases extend to the situation where a quarrel has its beginnings entirely outside of and disassociated from work, and employment only affords an opportunity for
previously aroused animosity to break into physical violence. However,
the reasoning of the more liberal courts appears sufficiently comprehensive to include even such an eventuality.
Obviously the instant decision departs from the weight of precedent
and widens the scope of the formula, "out of employment." The court
repudiates the time-honored necessity that the act be in line of duty,
or forward the work, or create a special risk; instead it finds sufficient
causal connection in the perils of human association. It reasons that
"in bringing men together, work brings these qualities together, caused
friction between them, creates occasions for lapses into carelessness,
for fun making and emotional flareup. These expressions of human
nature are incidents inseparable from working together." Inescapeably
this reflects the alloy of legal reasoning with judicial notion of desirability. It veers sharply toward the implication that any injury sustained during working hours may sufficiently "arise out of employ27
ment" regardless of the absence of a legalistic causal relation.
Such a trend may profitably be examined in the light of the evils
sought to be corrected by Workman's Compensation legislation. Industry was to bear the reasonable cost of human injury found to be
inseparable from and necessarily attributable to its functioning.28 Absolute liability was never sought to be imposed,29 aind such attempt would
hazard constitutional rejection for the Supreme Court has declared:
"It may be assumed that where an accident is in no matter related to
"Wakefield v. World Telegram, 249 App. Div. 884, 292 N. Y. Supp. 588
(3d Dep't 1937); cf. Wilson v. Boyd & Goforth, 207 N. C. 344, 177 S. E. 178
(1934)

(Claimant being chased by drunken co-worker fell and sustained in-

juries).
" Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Hoage, 85 F. (2d) 417 (App. D. C.

1936) (Seemingly compensation allowed solely because claimant was in "course
of employment").

'"Keybeev. Woodward-Walker Lumber Co., La., 147 So. 830 (1933); cf.
Carbone v. Loft, 219 N. Y. 646, 114 N. E. 1062 (1916).
."Fazio v. Cardillo, 109 F. (2d) 835 (App. D. C. 1940).
" A few statutes merely require that the injury occur "in the course of employment"; others require that the injury arise "out of or in the course of employment." Yet such statutes have received only a slight difference in treatment
from those containing a dual requirement. DODD, ADMINISTPAroN OF WoRIMEN's
COMPENSATION (1936) 680-683.

"'SeeNewman v. Industrial Comm., 203 Wis. 358, 360, 234 N. W. 495 (1931).
"Mueller Const. Co. v. Industrial Board, 283 Ill. 148, 118 N: E. 1028 (1918) ;
cf. dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice McKenna in Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer,
250 U. S.400, 39 Sup. Ct. 553, 63 L. ed. 1058 (1919).
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the employment, an attempt to make the employer liable would be so
dearly unreasonable and arbitrary as to subject it to the ban of the
constitution. 0 The instant decision is dangerously far-reaching in its
implications. A scrutiny of the aims underlying Workman's Compensation legislation may well prompt other courts to refuse to follow.
J. G. LAMONT.
"'Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418, 423, 44 Sup. Ct. 153,
154, 68 L. ed. 366 (1923).

